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Abstract 
This project examines the tension between China’s great power responsibilities and its 
traditional firm stance on state sovereignty, and how this is reflected in its position towards 
humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War period. It will do so by operationalizing 
Hedley Bull’s great power management theory into indicators that will identify a general 
pattern in China’s behavior towards humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era. 
Analyzing 11 cases from the 1990s to 2013 this project concludes that China's position on 
humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era, reflects not a tension, but a modification 
or merging of its traditional principles of sovereignty with the responsibilities of a great 
power in the modern day international society. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Problem identifying 
“There are few issues more pressing to contemporary world politics than intervention ” (Lawson 
& Tardelli, 2013: 1233). So begins a newly published article in Review of International Studies 
special issue on interventions. Nevertheless, the question of intervention has been a topic in 
international politics for centuries. Especially, who has the right to intervene, and when and 
how to intervene are subjects of this question. The answer has varied throughout time, but 
one point has been consistent: intervention is a tool reserved for great powers (Lawson & 
Tardelli: 1241p.)  
 
During the Cold War, intervention was frequently conducted by both the United States (US) 
and the Soviet Union. This was mainly conducted in order to maintain the balance of power 
between them and to extend their spheres of influence (Lawson & Tardelli: 1252). A number 
of interventions during the Cold War were justified on the grounds of preserving the 
international order. Nevertheless, these interventions were widely perceived to be conflicting 
with the Charter of the United Nations (UN) (Wheeler, 2000: 1). The UN Charter was a 
product of the post-World War II visions of international peace and security (Davis, 2002). 
This entailed an emphasis on state sovereignty and non-intervention in the Charter, thereby 
restricting the use of force to self-defense only, as Chapter VII, article 51 in the UN Charter 
underlines (UN Charter). Consequently, territorial integrity and non-interference came to be 
the standards for keeping international order. 
 
By the end of the Cold War new questions arose. If interventions during the Cold War could be 
justified by preserving the international order, what could then justify interventions in the 
grave conflicts with massive humanitarian expenses, which surfaced in the 1990’s? This 
question exposes the dilemma between respecting the sovereignty of the state and protecting 
populations against mass atrocity crimes. Post-Cold War conflicts, such as Rwanda, raised 
questions about the principle of non-intervention, opening op for whether or not, the Security 
Council should be empowered to authorize intervention on humanitarian grounds (Davis, 
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2002, ICISS, 2001a: XII)? Arguably there had been a shift in the international society’s 
perception of intervention. Nicholas Wheeler identifies such a shift when he argues that in the 
1970’s, the international society was not ready to accept humanitarian claims as legitimate 
reasons for justifying interventions. But by the 1990’s this changed as the United Nation’s 
Security Council (UNSC) authorized interventions on humanitarian grounds, establishing 
these as the new “standard of appropriate behavior” (Wheeler, 2000: 8). With this new 
standard, there seemed to be international consensus on humanitarian interventions, 
degrading the principle of non-intervention. Ever since, humanitarian intervention has been 
steadily integrated into the international society’s visions regarding such issues (Roberts, 
1999: 11). One of the latest examples is the emergence of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)1 in 
2001. This came in the light of the 1990’s failed interventions in Kosovo and Rwan da. As a 
result, the UN’s seventh Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented a conception of dual 
responsibility. This implied that states were: 
 
“now understood to be instruments at the service of their people, and 
not vice versa”, and Annan further argued: “when we read the 
charter today, we are more than ever conscious that the aim is to 
protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse 
them” (Annan, 1999).  
 
Along those lines, R2P came to represent a reconceptualization of the relationship between 
state sovereignty and human rights, with emphasis on how military force for humanitarian 
purposes was an exceptional measure (Garwood-Gowers, 2012: 3). This signaled a new era 
for the principle of intervention. Nevertheless, the dilemma of state sover eignty versus human 
rights still remains, evident in the way some states still struggle to balance the two concepts. 
One state that seems to have particular difficulties in handling this is China. 
                                                 
1
R2P consist of three pillars, the first referring to the sovereign state having the primary responsibility of 
protecting its population from mass atrocity. The second pillar includes the responsibility of the international 
community to respond in a timely and decisive manner if the sovereign state fails to fulfill its responsibility, 
emphasizing military measures as the last resort. The third and last pillar concerns the responsibility to rebuild 
the capacity of the sovereign state to fulfill its duty of protecting (ICISS, 2001a: VII). 
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The case of China  
In the Kosovo crisis, for instance, China opposed the UNSC to take action on the grounds that 
no intervention should take place without the consent of the hosting state (Davis, 2011). Also 
in recent humanitarian crises, such as Syria, China has been blocking UNSC resolutions 
authorizing military force (UNSC, 2012a). In doing so, Michael Davis argues, China places itself 
opposite of the global trend (Davis, 2011). But does this entail that China is prioritizing state 
sovereignty over human rights? For decades, China has engaged itself in the inte rnational 
human rights system, which indicates that an emphasis on human rights is not too distant for 
China. In a Chatham House report, it is argued that human rights for China, is an issue to be 
managed through power politics and a state’s core interests , such as economic growth and 
stability. However, China’s role is hardly ever scrutinized in issues regarding humanitarian 
interventions (Sceats & Breslin, 2012: 1p.). Michael Davis suggests this is because:  
 
“China is perceived to be irrelevant to the emerging post-Cold War 
norms in this area or it is viewed as simply an insurmountable 
obstacle, so far out of step with the rest of the world that it should be 
ignored” (Davis, 2002). 
 
This quote might be an overstatement, but historical documents such as Ch ina’s The five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, shows that China have a traditional stance emphasizing 
non-intervention and state sovereignty (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 1982). 
The economist Fred Bergsten seconds Davis, but argues that the perception presented by 
Davis is changing (Bergsten et al., 2008: 10). Is China then becoming a relevant player within 
the international society, and has it not always been that? In 1974, China’s leader Deng 
Xiaoping stated: “China is not a superpower, nor will it ever seek to be one” (Bergsten et al., 
2008: 1). But is that true in today’s context? Most scholars would argue that this is not the 
case in present times, and stress the fact that China is already a great power or a rising great 
power (Buzan, 2010:5, Garwood-Gowers, 2012: 9p.). Joseph Cheng and Franklin Zhang, for 
instance, argue that China during the twentieth century rose from a weak state to an 
important player. They explain this with the Reform and Opening to the Outside World 
program, which was introduced in late 1978, which included a vision for China to become an 
important, strategic power. They additionally argued that this program laid the foundation for 
China’s steep growth (Cheng & Zhang, 1999: 91). This argument is seconded by B arry Buzan, 
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who likewise emphasize China’s growth and, in continuation hereof, take China’s rise “ as a 
given” (Buzan, 2010: 5). According to these scholars, China is  ‘re-entering’ world politics as a 
great power. What does that entail for the international society and its policies? As touched 
upon earlier, China seems to value the principle of non-intervention and state sovereignty, but 
what happens if a rising great power does not share its worldview with the rest of the 
international society? Will this affect the international policies on humanitarian intervention? 
Andrew Garwood-Gowers argues that R2P presents a direct challenge to China’s approach on 
intervention (Garwood-Gowers, 2013: 2). Does this place China in a position where it has to 
redefine its stance on this issue? Inspired by Hedley Bull’s writings on great powers, the 
answer would most likely be that it has to. With great power, comes great responsibility. One 
such responsibility is satisfying the wishes of the society (Bull, 2002: 220p., Bull, 1980: 437p.).  
 
As the emergence of R2P suggests, there is an international trend pointing towards an 
increased emphasis on human rights rather than on state sovereignty. If this is the intention 
of the international society, following Bull’s line of thought, China has to promote the principle 
of humanitarianism to some extend. Hence, if China is to act as a great power, it cannot choose 
not to follow the standards of the international society. Along those lines, Lawson and Tardelli 
also argue that China might need to redefine its approach to intervention; 
 
“In part, the right to intervene held by Great Powers rested on 
superior power capabilities; in part it rested on status (...) if superior 
power capabilities makes intervention something Great Powers can 
do, their concern for status makes intervention something Great 
Powers must do (...)” (Lawson & Tardelli, 2013: 1243).  
 
According to this, it seems that China would have to reconsider its traditional stance and 
redefine its approach to fit the policies of the international society, in order to fulfill its 
responsibilities as the great power Buzan and Garwood-Gowers suggest that it is. 
 
As emphasized throughout this introduction, the dilemma of interventions raises a range of 
questions. With these questions in mind we wonder if internal crises, which include massive 
human rights violations, with possible external consequences, should render the territorial 
integrity of a state intact? And in such cases, is the international community entitled to act in 
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order save the population subject to such horrors? How are these two rights to be balanced? 
Is it at all possible to respect state sovereignty while conducting a humanitarian intervention 
in that same state? After the Cold War, all of these questions have become more prominent in 
international politics (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010: 131). We believe that China, seemingly a 
rising great power, finds itself caught in this dilemma. It seems that the principle of non -
intervention has been highly valued in Chinese foreign policy. However, this principle is likely 
to clash with the responsibilities that derive from being a great power that would evidently 
create tension if China is one. This establishes our field of study and we will in continuation 
hereof, determine the Chinese behavior towards humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold 
War era, within the forum of the UNSC2. We will do so by conducting an analysis driven 
mainly by the English School scholar Hedley Bull’s writings on great power management, 
derived from his book ‘The Anarchical Society’ (1977). However, we will continue by first 
presenting an overview of the literature which we have engaged with during the research of 
this subject. This research and our interest in great power management within the 
international society, led us to work with literature within the International Relations 
tradition of the English School. 
 
Literature review 
Through the research we came across a vast and rich literature on humanitarian intervention 
and the varying perspectives about how great powers use them differently. Some of these 
perspectives were used throughout the research while others helped construct and elaborate 
a base for it. Scholars, as political leaders, are widely divided on the issue of intervention and 
thus their takes on its intended practice by the great powers vary extensively too. Some, like 
the pluralists within the English School, argue that humanitarian intervention is merely a tool 
for strong states to step over weak states’ sovereignty in pursuit of their vested interests. 
Others, like the solidarists and the Just War theorists, disagree by claiming that interventions 
are rescuing ventures and therefore a responsibility of the strong states. This is entailed by 
the rights they have, to protect the peoples of the international community. In addition to this 
there are other scholars and practitioners outside the English School who also contribute a lot 
                                                 
2
We will argue in the conceptualization, chapter two, how we perceive the UNSC to be where the great powers of 
today take all the important decisions of international peace and security. It is therefore also here decisions of 
humanitarian intervention are taken, and where we are likely to observe China’s stance on this, and possible 
changes in this.  
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to the debate in either ways, constituting a third group, with scholars such as Mary Kaldor and 
Helen Stacy.  
 
Starting of with the pluralist international-society theory that defines humanitarian 
intervention “as a violation of the cardinal rules of sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use of 
force” (Wheeler, 2010: 11). Their main focus is on the provision of international order by 
international society regardless of each state’s distinct conception of justice. The principal 
bearers of rights and duties in international law are the state, and not the individuals. 
Additionally, they are skeptical of states being able to develop agreements “beyond a minimum 
ethic of coexistence” (Wheeler, 2010: 11). Hence, arguing that the efforts of pursuing 
individual justice by means of unilateral humanitarian intervention put in jeopardy the 
structure of inter-state order. This is why Hedley Bull while assigning duties to the great 
powers, assigns them to maintain international order, through his writing on great power 
management, rather than protecting human rights (Bull, 2002: 201). As Bull puts it, balance of 
power should rightly be translated as maneuvers by great powers to gain ascendancy. 
Therefore, he claims that great powers are not always ‘great responsibles’, but could mostly 
be considered the opposite, namely ‘great predators’ (Bull, 2006: 39). This view is also 
reflected in the UN Charter where the use of force is only permissible when there is a threat to 
international peace and security (UN Charter). Along with Bull, this view includes other 
pluralists like Robert Jackson, Adam Roberts, and James Mayall. 
 
A more radical counterpart to the pluralists challenging the above view is the solidarist that 
seeks to deepen its commitments to justice as to strengthen the legitimacy of international 
society. Regarding this, Wheeler argues: 
 
“Rather than see order and justice locked in a perennial tension, 
solidarism looks to the possibility of overcoming this conflict by 
developing practices that recognize the mutual interdependence 
between the two claims” (Wheeler, 2010: 11).  
 
This conception of international society recognizes that individuals have rights and duties in 
international law, but it also acknowledges that individuals can have these rights enforced by 
states only. Consequently, the central character of a solidarist society becomes not only the 
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moral responsibility for states to protect their own citizens, but also the wider one of 
“guardianship of human rights everywhere” (Wheeler, 2010: 11). Hence, this viewpoint argues 
in favor of interventions when a state is involved in massive violations of human rights of i ts 
people. They claim once a state uses its machinery against its own people it loses its right to 
be taken as legitimate sovereign, thereby morally sanctioning other states to intervene. 
Scholars within the English School that argue along these lines are Nicholas Wheeler, Alex 
Bellamy and John Vincent. Complementing this view of the English Schools is the Just War 
Theory and the scholar Michael Walzer. Practitioners like Gareth Evans, who was responsible 
for the R2P doctrine, also has the same views on great power responsibilities that advocates 
for the use of force when needed.  
 
Others like Helen Stacy, Mary Kaldor, Thomas Weiss and Chris Brown takes a rather different 
view on how great powers need to maintain order in the international society. They stre ss 
finding solutions other than intervention to problems that could also be solved through 
peaceful means. Kaplan argues that the most effective solutions would be ones that come from 
within the cultures themselves (Kaldor, 2010: 187). Brown has his own approach of finding 
solutions to addressing conflicts in order to save more lives. This is by working at the national 
level and persuading powerful states to monitor their relationship with the weak states, 
ensuring that they are not supporting tyrants or injustices. This monitoring could keep later 
fallouts in control by regulating it along the way (Brown, 2010: 314).  
 
From the literature that we briefly summed up, we derive as our area of interest how great 
powers handle the issue of humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, since there seemingly is 
not a systematized theory of humanitarian intervention within the English School, we regard 
Hedley Bull’s writings on great power management to be the most relevant alternative, since 
intervention is a great power tool.  
 
In present times humanitarian intervention has taken such a prominent place in international 
politics, that it has become a common issue in the UNSC in the post-Cold War period. China, 
being a permanent member of the Council, has a responsibility to manage and solve 
humanitarian crises along with the other members. They cannot unilaterally decide how to 
manage such crises, and must therefore, manage the relationship with the fellow council 
members.  
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Thus, we find it intriguing to examine China’s role in the UNSC and how it deals with the issue 
of humanitarian intervention, while not eroding its traditional stance. Hence, that is why we 
ask as our Problem Formulation: 
 
How does China's positioning on humanitarian intervention in the 
post-Cold War era reflect the tension between its responsibilities of 
great power status, and its traditional firm stance on state 
sovereignty? 
 
In order to make the problem formulation more workable and comprehensive, we have scaled 
down to three Research Questions: 
 
1. What is China’s traditional stance on state sovereignty, and what is its origin?  
2. Is China a great power, and what are the responsibilities of a great power?  
 
These questions entails that we need to determine China’s position on humanitarian 
intervention. This will be carried out through a summary of China’s history and crucial events 
that have affected this stance. Using Bull’s theory on great power management, we further 
need to identify China as a great power and thus the responsibilities that follows. The se 
responsibilities are showed through the actions and statements expressed in the UNSC . With 
that established, we will be able to trace patterns in China’s behavior towards humanitarian 
intervention in the post-Cold War period. Finally, this enables us to determine whether the 
traditional stance and the great power responsibilities, in some way conflict.  
 
Before conducting the actual investigation of these questions, we must provide our 
methodological and theoretical considerations. Therefore, the next chapter will shed light on 
the purpose of research, which will touch upon the initial interest as well as the academic 
contribution of this project. We will present a comprehensive research design, which will 
provide a layout of the project. Moreover, the limitations and confinements of the choices 
made in this connection will be addressed. This is followed by a section regarding the choice 
of theory. In this we will present the arguments for selecting Bull’s theory on great power 
management, followed by a conceptualization of concepts derived from the theory. We will 
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also determine the reasons for conducting the investigation through acts and statements in 
the UNSC, in this section. Lastly, based on a systematized conceptualization, we will 
operationalize great power management behavior through a range of indicators, which will be 
applied in the analysis in order to determine China’s behavior towards humanitarian 
intervention, and thus answer the problem formulation.  
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2. Method 
This chapter will present our methodological framework and how we intend to investigate the 
problem formulation and research questions. Firstly we will present an outline of the purpose 
of research, research design, and limitations and confinements. Secondly, we will elaborate on 
our theoretical foundation of Bull’s theory, leading to a conceptualization and 
operationalization that will establish an explicit basis for our analysis. 
 
Purpose of Research and Research Design 
Purpose of Research 
This project explores China’s position on humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era, 
and how this might reflect a tension between the state’s responsibilities as a great power, and 
its traditional firm stance on state sovereignty. This study is conducted in the light of one of 
the most pressing issues in International Relations after the Cold War; humanitarian 
intervention (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010: 131). In relation to this, and what was outlined in the 
introduction, a great number of International Relations scholars seem to agree that China is a 
rising power, if not on the path to becoming a ‘superpower’ (Buzan, 2010: 5, Garwood -
Gowers, 2012: 9 p). We agree with the scholars arguing that this increase in power comes 
with an increasing role in solving issues of international peace and security,  including 
questions of humanitarian crisis and intervention (Garwood-Gowers, 2012: 2).  Further, we 
argue that these decisions, since the end of the Cold War, have been taken in the UNSC, 
wherefore we find it important to examine China’s stance on humanitarian intervention, 
through their actions and rhetoric in the UNSC. It is equally important to take into account the 
relatively small body of research on China’s position on humanitarian intervention (Sceats 
and Breslin, 2012: 2, Davis, 2002). From all these arguments we find it an important purpose 
to contribute to the knowledge and understanding of China’s position, on the many 
humanitarian crisis of the post-Cold War period. Regardless of the degree to which China is a 
major global power, we deem it vital to examine its position one of the most fundamental 
value conflicts in International Relations. 
 
By having established the overall purpose of research, we are now ready to assess the 
research design presenting the overall layout of this project.  
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Research Design 
Having presented our field of interest in the introduction, and our problem formulation, this 
part will outline the structure of the rest of the project. In order to provide a comprehensive 
overview of this structure, we have designed the following model:  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Project Design, own construction.  
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Explained from the top down, the introduction has established the motivation and our initial 
interests for the field of study. These points lead us to the problem formulation and the two 
research questions3. Having established the research questions, we will in the methods 
chapter address the purpose of research, the research design, the selected time frame and 
cases, the chosen theory, and the selected empirical material. Additionally, the chapter will 
entail a conceptualization of Bull’s theory. This leads us to the systematized concepts of the 
most important parts of his theory; a great power definition and great power management. 
The concept of great power management is operationalized for us to be able to trace the 
behavior of China in the analysis. The first part of the analysis seeks to address the first and 
second research question. This part begins by assessing the Chinese traditional stance 
towards humanitarian intervention, and how this has roots in the historical experiences. 
Second, we define whether China is a great power in the contemporary international society, 
and what the responsibilities deriving from this might be. For that we will apply Hedley Bull’s 
theory, and his definition of great powers. The problem formulation is addressed in the sub-
chapters in the analysis, divided into the years 1990-1999, 2000-2006, and 2007-2013. 
Through these time periods we will follow China’s official arguments of its voting behavior. 
This means that the problem formulation will be answered in the overall conclusion of the 
project. 
 
Having presented the research design, we will now explain the reasons for dividing our time 
frame, and thus the analysis, into three sub-chapters.  
 
The Post-Cold War Era 
As stated in the introduction, this project is investigating China’s stance on humanitarian 
intervention in the post-Cold War era. As Thomas G. Weiss argues: "The end of the Cold War 
made possible UN decisions about international security that had not been feasible for some 40 
years" (Weiss, 2011: 265). This statement serves as a perfect illustration of why it is intriguing 
to start an investigation about a nation’s stance on humanitarian intervention, in the post-
Cold War International Relations climate. We are in line with scholars such as Weiss, Wheeler 
and Walling who argues that the UNSC was largely paralyzed during the Cold War, and that 
human rights were perceived as a domestic issue of the sovereign state (Wheeler, 2000: 139, 
                                                 
3
See Introduction.  
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Walling: 2013: 8). The post-Cold War era saw the UNSC playing a central role in legitimating 
the use of force in defense of humanitarianism, in contrast with the Cold War, where 
humanitarian intervention were in effect seen as impermissible (ibid.). Therefore, somewhat 
symbolic, we established 1990 as the point of departure for this study. From this point of 
departure we divided the 23 year long period into three headlines: 1990-1999, 2000-2006 
and 2007-2013. The first time frame begins with the case of Iraq in 1991, which were the first 
humanitarian crisis to be categorized as a ‘threat to international peace and security’ (Walling, 
2013: 7p.). Additionally, it was the first time for the UNSC to demand action on a human rights 
concern, creating what Weiss has referred to as a ‘humanitarian impulse’ in the UNSC 
(Wheeler, 2000: 169, Weiss, 2011: 267). Only a few years after Iraq followed the genocide in 
Rwanda. In 2004, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in a UN Press Release about the 1994 
Rwandan crisis that “The international community failed Rwanda, and that must leave us 
always with a sense of bitter regret and abiding sorrow” (UNSG 2004a). Where the lack of 
action in Rwanda was due to an unwillingness to get involved in the conflict, the crisis in 
Kosovo in 1999 is an example of how the UNSC could not reach an agreement because of 
Russian and Chinese threats to veto any UN authorization (Morris, 2013: 1269). The cases of 
Rwanda and Kosovo serves as examples of why, the international society was in need of a new 
direction in the field of humanitarian intervention. This brought about the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report on R2P in 2001 (ICISS, 
2001a: VII). Hence, the second period is established due to the emergence of R2P, which by 
scholars is referred to as the new doctrine on humanitarian intervention. Weiss, for one, 
states:  
 
“I firmly believe we have had an ethical breakthrough of sorts: R2P 
qualifies as emerging customary law after centuries of more or less 
passive and mindless acceptance of the proposition that state sovereignty 
was a license to kill” (Weiss, 2011: 227).   
 
The emergence of such a doctrine, therefore qualifies as a shift in the evolution on 
humanitarian intervention, which require some attention. Originally we determined this 
period to end in 2005 were the doctrine was adopted in the World Summit Outcome 
Document (WSOD). However, we found that the doctrine was implemented by the UNSC in 
resolution 1674 in 2006 (UNSC, 2006a). The first R2P resolution was adopted as a mandate to 
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a peacekeeping force in the crisis of Darfur that same year (UNSC, 2006b). For this reason, we 
decided to end the second period with the implementation of R2P in the UNSC in 2006, and 
thus the last period is focused on the stance towards humanitarian intervention from 2007 
and onwards. In this last period we have selected contemporary crises such as Libya in 2011 
and Syria in 2013 which are cases receiving enormous media attention for its horrific death 
tolls (Huffington Post, 2011, BBC, 2013).  
 
Having established the reasons for choosing these three time periods, we will now elaborate 
on the cases selected within these periods.  
Cases  
In order to examine China’s stance on humanitarian intervention we have selected a total of 
11 cases that we believe will illustrate how they manage their  great power responsibilities 
and duties. The cases, or crisis, are as follows: Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Kosovo, Darfur, 
Myanmar, Zimbabwe, Libya and Syria. In addition to this we examine the emergence of R2P, 
which scholars such as Alex Bellamy argues, is a norm that has shifted the balance of 
humanitarian intervention in direction of supporting the protection of populations suffering 
under atrocities  (Bellamy, 2010: 144, 2013: 352).  
 
Arguably, it is a lot of cases to engage with, and we acknowledge the possibility that the 
investigation has the risk of only ‘scratching the surface’ of the cases. However, we find it 
necessary to include a large number of cases, as each of them led China to define and clarify its 
stance on state sovereignty and non-intervention. Additionally, it gives us the opportunity to 
identify a pattern in Chinese rhetoric and action regarding these issues, and thus reach a 
conclusion on China’s traditional stance and how it has evolved. If we were to focus on a small 
number of cases, such as one in every time period, it would not be possible to detect a general 
pattern with the same robustness, as our long time frame offers.  
 
We have selected our 11 cases on a number of criteria: firstly, the cases chosen are considered 
as humanitarian crises, in the post-Cold War era. This naturally implies a number of cases 
much higher than was possible to investigate. We therefore added the criteria of the crises 
relating to a Chapter VII intervention, since these are the ones farthest from China’s 
traditional view on the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference. Moreover, we 
had prior knowledge on some cases where China had shown interesting behavior, through 
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their voting or rhetorical positioning, such as Myanmar and Kosovo. Certainly, media 
exposure and scholarly attention have also influenced the selection of cases, guiding us 
towards the most polemic and controversial cases. Along with these acknowledgements, the 
time constraints regarding this project induced a pragmatism to the selection of cases, in the 
manner of seeing what each added to the investigation as we went. We will not go into details 
of why we have chosen each one of the 11 cases, as these criteria and acknowledgements 
coupled with the presentation of the cases in the analysis, should provide the arguments to an 
appropriate degree. We will however argue for the choice of R2P, as this is not a case in the 
same nature as the others.  
 
The emergence of R2P has created enormous scholarly debate, also between states in th e 
international society, about the implementation of humanitarian intervention (Brown, 2010: 
310 pp., Garwood-Gowers: 2013: 1, Evans, 2010, 320 pp.). The attention and effect this norm 
has had on the debate about humanitarian intervention has made it impossible to ignore, both 
for us as students, and for China as an international actor. Therefore we deem it relevant to 
include an analysis of China’s position towards R2P, as we believe this will shed light on how 
steadfast China’s position on non-intervention and respect for state sovereignty is, when 
facing alternatives. The emergence of R2P provide, as argued earlier, an explanation for the 
overall time frame, but is in the analysis to be treated as a case on the same terms as the 10 
other cases. These terms are based on the project’s theoretical foundation, which we will 
explore in the next paragraph.  
 
Theory 
For the study of China, their position on humanitarian intervention, and their great power 
responsibilities, we have selected Hedley Bull's theory on great power management. The 
reason for doing this is that we are examining a state that by many scholars has been put in 
the great power category. Furthermore, Bull's approach has the advantage of being able to 
incorporate aspects of realism, liberalism and constructivism (Bull, 2002: VII). His theory 
derives from the 1977 book 'The Anarchical Society', where he outlines the view that states 
form an international society amongst themselves, conceiving themselves to be bound 
together by common interests, values, and set of rules in their relations with each other (Bull, 
2002: 13). In this project, we will regard the UNSC as representing the international society, 
which we will outline further in a conceptualization.  
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In our initial thoughts on this project, we included a theoretical framework of not only Bull, 
but also fellow English School scholars Adam Roberts and Robert Jackson. This, however, 
proved to be too comprehensive, wherefore we opted for going with only one scholar and 
theory4. Furthermore, from Bull’s great contributions to the International Relations field, we 
chose to mainly focus on his writing on great power management and the tools, or roles, that 
are available for great powers when contributing to international society. We acknowledge 
that Bull's theories might not be the most practical ones, since his writings were highly 
influenced by philosophy, and that the great power management theory are taken out of a 
bigger context, seeking to analyze and assess the possibilities of order in world politics during 
the Cold War (ibid.). However, we see it not only as a challenge, but also as an academic 
contribution, to try and apply his great power management theory in a contemporary setting, 
and on a contemporary great power's behavior. 
 
We will outline Bull's writing on great power management in the conceptualization sub-
chapter, as well as his definition of what being a great power entails, so as to be able to apply 
this on China's actions and rhetoric in the cases. For now, we will proceed to a br ief outline of 
the empirical material we have selected, followed by a discussion of the limitations and 
confinements of this project.  
 
Empirical material 
This project is a qualitative study. Regarding our cases the empirical material we have 
selected are mainly UN verbatim coverage, referring to the official statements and rhetoric 
following meetings and votes in the UNSC. The official documents has been supported by 
books, journals and reports both from scholars, such as Hedley Bull and Nicholas Wheeler, as 
well as official documents such as the ICISS’s report. In terms of the implications of the 
qualitative nature our empirical material, this will be discussed in connection to the 
operationalization.  
 
                                                 
4
For more about the implication of this choice, see ‘Limitations and Confinements’.  
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Limitations and Confinements  
Throughout the making of this project we have had to take decisions regarding cases, 
theories, methodology and so on. This sub-chapter will outline some of the limitations and 
confinements these decisions have brought with them.  
 
From a lecture concerning the great powers and their management and hierarchy, we were 
introduced to Hedley Bull’s writing on great power management. We see Bull’s theories as 
offering perspective on the analysis of the behavior of great powers in International Relations, 
that at times seems grossly dominated by strands of neo-realism and liberalism. This is 
because he is an English School theorist. English School, Bull qualifies, is a tradition that 
positions itself between the realist and the liberalist tradition. Unlike the realists this theory 
qualifies that states are not involved in simple struggles, but common institutions and rules 
limit their conflicts with one another. However, unlike the liberalists they believe that ‘ states 
are the principal reality in international politics’ rather than individuals. Overall the English 
School scholars’ understanding of international politics articulates neither conflict of interest 
between states nor complete harmony between them (Bull, 2006: 38). 
 
When choosing to apply only one scholar to our empirical material, certain points needs to be 
discussed. First of all, there are both benefits and losses by using only Bull’s theory on great 
powers, and their management. One the one hand, we can go into details with his writings, 
connecting his theory with our empirical material and cases in a more substantive manner. On 
the other hand, we lose the interplay and new aspects that can derive from using different 
theories on a particular case, including covering the weak parts of each theory. In connection 
to this we find it important to highlight the relative division of the English School. As stated in 
the literature review, this tradition, with its particular focus on an international society, is 
commonly divided into pluralists and solidarists. Especially, with regard to the discussion of 
humanitarian intervention, being the embodiment of the conflicting concepts of non -
intervention and human rights is the English School divided.  
 
The pluralists of the English School generally focus on how the rules of international s ociety 
provide an international order among states sharing different conceptions of justice (Wheeler, 
2000: 11). In this vein, rights and duties in the international society are granted to sovereign 
states, and individuals living in the state have only the rights given to them by the that state, 
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or by the society of states (ibid.). Solidarists on the other hand, argue that the individuals 
themselves have rights and duties, although enforced by states. This leads to the argument 
that a solidarist society of states is one in which the states have a duty and responsibility to 
not only protect human rights of their own citizens, but human rights everywhere (Wheeler, 
2000: 12).  
 
Although it is open for discussion, Bull himself, is commonly placed in the pluralis t camp5. 
This goes to say that when choosing Hedley Bull as the theoretical focal point of this study, we 
are also analyzing China within a pluralistic framework. This entails that we analyze China 
within a framework where, as Andrew Linklater has coined it:  “(...) states are able to agree on 
the need for order despite their competing views of justice” (Wheeler & Dunne; 1996: 95). We 
regard the UNSC as an arena, where the great powers settle their different perspectives of 
justice in the name of the international order, or in UN terms, the international peace and 
security.  
 
There are two main reasons why a pluralist point of departure makes sense for this particular 
study: the first is the pluralist view on intervention, supported by Bull, that a humanitar ian 
intervention doctrine would be deeply subversive to the international order. A  view, which is 
shared by China, as we will show in a brief exploration of Chinese traditional view on 
humanitarian intervention. The second reason is how Bull, along with scholars such as John 
Vincent, on many occasions underline that a society of states is not solidarist enough to 
legitimize collective humanitarian intervention (Wheeler & Dunne, 1996: 104, Wheeler, 2000: 
309). We believe this claim has been challenged with the emergence of R2P, creating a new 
norm on the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. This evolution in the norms of 
humanitarian intervention makes a study applying Hedley Bull’s writings in a contemporary 
setting, important for assessing the continuing relevance of his writings. By following this 
path we are confining ourselves from scholars such as Nicholas Wheeler, and his attempts at 
creating a solidarist theory of humanitarian intervention. This could have been applied to find 
solidarist inclinations in the Chinese view on humanitarian intervention, over the post-Cold 
War period. Similarly, as mentioned in the theory sub-chapter, we have confined ourselves 
from using Adam Roberts and Robert Jackson. In particular Adam Roberts and his writings on 
how states are driven by their appearance and interest could have yielded interesting aspects 
                                                 
5
See Wheeler & Dunne, 1996.  
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on the motivations behind China’s rhetoric and voting behavior. However, for the sake of 
being able to go into details, and to a degree simplicity, we favored a one theory solution. That 
being said, although having been omitted from the theoretical framework, we will bring other 
English School scholars up in the analysis, as either a support or counterpoint to our 
interpretations.  
 
In terms of the empirical focus of the project, being China, we were initially working on a 
framework, which included Russia. If we had included Russia in the study we could have made 
a comparison of their great power management, and by doing so gained a more thorough and 
comprehensive knowledge of how great powers manage their relations in contemporary 
times. However, focusing on two great powers at the same time did carry the risk of missing 
important details that could have been brought to the surface, had more time been spent on in 
depth analysis on only one state. It is also a much more ambitious project given the 
restrictions of this project, in particular page-wise, and therefore it was abandoned.  
 
Regarding cases it is obvious that over such a long period as the one we are examining,  we 
have had to limit our research and omit certain cases. In particular a typically cited case 
regarding humanitarian intervention such as Bosnia was omitted on the simple fact, that after 
analyzing the crisis, the results did not yield anything that the cases already covered had not. 
Furthermore, we have limited our study from cases where China has voted for, or let 
resolutions pass, without any polemics. It can be argued that cases with UNSC agreement 
could prove as interesting examples of China’s great power management, than the more 
controversial and ‘Chapter VII focused’ ones.  
We obviously cannot deny that some of the cases we omitted might have proved highly 
relevant for assessing Chinese great power management. Instead we must find this a prudent 
place to refer to Bull’s argument, that International Relations is highly dependent on intuition 
and on judging,  ‘that things are this way and not that’ (Bull, 1966: 366p.).  
 
Lastly, we have confined ourselves from quantitative methods. It is possible that an overview 
of all Chinese abstentions, vetoes and votes for Chapter VII mandates, might have revealed an 
interesting pattern, or a statistic of Chinese defense spending could illustrate their rise as a 
great power. However, we adhere to Bull’s opinion that questions of international relations 
relies on judgment and intuition, and interpretative methods such as those used by Bull, and 
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in more contemporary times Wheeler (Bull, 1966: 366pp., Wheeler, 2000: 8). This stance will 
be explained further in the operationalization part after the following conceptualization. This 
will outline the main elements of the great power management theory, as well as his 
definition of a great power, leading to a systematization of these.  
 
Conceptualization  
Having discussed the implications of our choices and limitations, including the reasoning for 
using Bull’s great power management theory, this sub-chapter will establish concepts derived 
from this theory. Bull’s theory on great power management is rather broad, wherefore we  
need to scale it down to a level that is applicable to the investigation. Thus, in what follows, 
we will define concepts derived from the theory, and then relate those to our field of study in 
a further systematization.  
 
In The ‘Anarchical Society’, Bull establishes the nature of order within the international society 
consisting of sovereign states. The sovereign states have formed this society conscious of a 
number of common values and certain common interests, and conceive themselves to be 
bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another (Bull, 2002: 13). In this 
society the states are not equal in power, wherefore order in this society consists of a 
‘hierarchy in the anarchy of states’. This means that the states with the greatest powe r has a 
higher degree of influence on any issue at hand, than the weaker states. This influence the 
great powers apply, so as to play a role in promoting the international order (Bull 2002, p. 
199p.). Bull argues that these great powers and their balance of power play a crucial role in 
the formation and maintenance of international order (Bull, 2002: 201). In this project, we 
will mainly focus our exploration on China as a great power, the responsibilities that come 
with the title, and in continuation hereof, examples such as how it balances power to enforce 
order.   
 
Bull provides a definition and a range of requirements that should be met in order to be titled 
a great power. Firstly, Bull emphasizes that a great power cannot exist without a counter -
power. This means that in a society of states there must be a minimum of two great powers, 
which are comparable in status. These powers constitute a club of great powers, and the 
members, according to Bull, must be front rank when it comes to military strength. These 
cannot, however, be characterized as great powers if the rest of the international society does 
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not recognize them to have special rights and duties within this society (Bull, 2002: 194 pp). 
Great powers thus claim the right to play a part in determining the issues that affect peace and 
security. This implies that sometimes the great powers need to take account of the interest 
and values of other states; “they accept the duty, or are thought by others to have the duty, of 
modifying their policies in the light of the managerial responsibility they bear” (Bull, 2002: 196). 
The great power’s rights and duties come to embody a principle of hierarchy in the 
international society (Bull, 1980: 1p). The great power and its responsibilities thus contribute 
to the construction of the international society. By virtue of this superior strength the great 
powers contribute to the upholding of the international order in two ways: by managing their 
relations with one another, and by exploiting its preponderance (Bull, 2002: 201). This 
constitutes a range of different ways that a great power can choose to behave:  
 
Preservation of the General Balance of Power 
Bull defines this as the amount of collaboration among the great powers, and how the power 
positions itself in this collaboration. However, this does not ensure peaceful relations between 
the great powers (Bull, 2002: 201p). The desire for some degree of order can be so powerful 
and universal, that a great power in some instances accepts values that not are in line with its 
policy and ideology. Great powers sometimes prefer this over a breakdown of the 
international order (Bull 1980: 3). Preserving the general balance of power is essential for the 
great powers, because it provides the conditions needed for the maintenan ce of the 
international order. As a result the lesser states confer the special rights and duties to the 
great power as long as the order is maintained (Bull, 2002: 201).  
 
Avoidance and Control of Crises 
It is necessary for great powers to be able to avoid crises and to control them if they occur, as 
international peace is not necessarily ensured by the general balance of power. Great powers 
can control crises in three different ways:  
 
(a) By promoting common interests, either separately or jointly, in order to avoid 
crises turning into wars (Bull, 2002: 202).   
(b) By seeking to avoid provocative behavior, and to allow one another to retreat with 
a minimum loss of face (Bull, 2002: 204).  
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(c) By respecting each other’s spheres of influence. This entails that the great powers 
must recognize rules that prohibits direct interference in an established sphere of 
influence. These rules include prohibition of illegal overflying and unconventional 
military action of another great powers territory (Bull, 2002: 205). 
 
Nevertheless, crises are sometimes manufactured by a great power in order to secure a 
diplomatic victory. If crises do occur, then great powers need to refrain from intervening 
unilaterally in another great power’s sphere of influence (Bull, 2002: 202p.).  
 
Limitation of War 
If great powers fail to avoid or control crisis, deliberately or not, and if they are mispreserving 
the general balance of power, wars can emerge. If a war does occur, great powers have the 
possibility to limit it through the following:   
 
a. Averting wars by accident or miscalculation. 
b. Reducing misunderstandings or misinterpretation of each other’s words and actions. 
This is also referred to as avoiding friction between great powers. 
c. Settling or containing political disputes by negotiation.  
d. Controlling competition on armaments through tacit and formal arms-control 
agreements.  
e. Preventing wars among lesser powers or limit them geographically, if they occur, so 
they do not come to affect the international society as a whole.   
f. By managing the relationship between lesser powers and with the great powers (Bull, 
2002: 206)  
 
A Unilateral Exercise of Local Preponderance  
Local preponderance can either be exercised in particular areas of the world or among a 
particular group of states, and it can take on three forms; dominance, primacy, and hegemony 
(Bull, 2002: 207). The former is characterized by the habitual use of force against a lesser 
state, and disregard of the lesser state’s universal rights, e.g. state sovereignty, equality, and 
independence (Bull, 2002: 207). Primacy, on the other hand, is a way of exploiting 
preponderance without the use or threat of force, and the leadership of the great power is 
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freely conceded to by the lesser states (Bull, 2002: 208). Lastly, hegemony is exercised by a 
great power over a lesser state where use of force is occasional, and is only resorted to in 
cases of extremity and with great reluctance. This implies that a great power is ready to 
violate universal rights, but nonetheless acknowledges the rights existence. In cases in which 
they are violated, they justify this by referring to overriding principles, for instance to 
preserve the international order (Bull, 2002: 209).  
 
Spheres of Influence 
Great powers can, according to Bull, exercise its preponderance in spheres of influence, which 
either can be positive or negative. These are established in order to avoid friction between 
great powers. Concerning spheres of influence, great powers can agree to confer limited and 
specific rights on each other, giving one great power a free hand in a specific area. This implies 
that a great power disinterest itself entirely in what the other power does within its own 
sphere of influence, so long as this disinterest is reciprocal (Bull, 2002: 214). Each power can, 
however, also seek to exclude the other powers from what it is seeking to achieve in a given 
area, Bull refers to this as negative spheres of influence (Bull, 2002: 215). By contrast, a 
positive sphere of influence sets up a division of labor among the great powers to the 
execution of a common task (Bull, 2002: 214).  
 
Great Power Concert or Condominium 
Lastly, great powers can contribute to the international order by joining forces and promoting 
common policies throughout the international system. This form of joint management would 
be directed towards a ‘structure of peace’, not for the world as such, but rather only for the 
great powers themselves (Bull, 2002: 286p.). Great powers are thus motivated to join forces 
in a condominium in order to keep the political status quo, and to challenge those states trying 
to disrupt this (Bull, 2002: 288).  
 
Systematized concept 
Great powers 
Following Bull, we define a great power within three criteria; there must be a minimum of two 
powers that are comparable in status, constituting a club of great powers. They must be in the 
front rank of military capabilities, and lastly they must be recognized by others and by the 
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leaders and peoples of the state to, have special rights and duties. Hence, this is the terms by 
which we will seek to define China as a great power in contemporary times, just as Bull did in 
1977. 
 
Furthermore, in this study we define the UNSC as the arena in which the 'club' of great powers 
meet, decide and contribute to the international order. It is in the UNSC that the great powers 
decide on the issues threatening the international order, they are bound by common rules, 
and they interact and manage their relations in the UNSC. However, we are not blind to the 
fact that the General Assembly is the one conferring the rights and duties onto the great 
powers, and therefore these states have a certain aspect of power (UNGA, 2013). We also 
acknowledge that these middle and small powers have a say on the issues of the international 
society. Nevertheless, we refer to Bull's argument that it is because states are wholly unequal 
in power, that certain issues are settled, where the demands of weak states can be left out of 
the settlement (Bull, 2002: 199). In matters of the UNSC, the strong states, here the 
permanent members have been recognized to be the ones ultimately capable of settling issues 
at hand, through their veto right. For the purpose of this project, the UNSC will therefore be 
defined as representing the international society, although this could be viewed as  somewhat 
controversial. Therefore, when we mention the great powers in the analysis, we refer to the 
UNSC permanent members; China, Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom and France 
(UNSC, 2013). 
 
Great power management 
We agree to the great power management behaviors being at the ‘disposal’ of the great 
powers, but adheres to Bull’s point that this is not a description of what great powers actually 
do, but rather a formulation of the roles they can, and sometimes do play (Bull, 2002: 200p.). 
In terms of the focus of this project this definition entails, that the ‘roles’ of great power 
management will not be played by the great powers at all times in all cases, neither can we 
expect them all to be applicable. Specifically, this means that China will not necessarily be 
displaying all the different ways of behavior at once in all cases of humanitarian crises, nor 
will all of them be appropriate or applicable in the setting of the UNSC. We argue that this is 
the case with the concepts of ‘local preponderance’, and ‘joint condominium’.  
 
Since the UN Charter prescribes that all action through the UNSC must be taken jointly and 
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through authorization from the permanent members6, unilateral action taken without UNSC 
authorization, such as local preponderance, falls outside the area in which we examine 
Chinese behavior (UN Charter). It can be argued that local preponderance can be meaningfully 
defined insofar as it can be condemned through the available channels of the UNSC, as it 
undermines the great power duty and right to take stake in determining and resolving crisis 
and war, in the international society. We acknowledge this, but remain true to Bull’s initial 
definition of the term, consequently defining local preponderance as the unilateral action of 
either dominance, primacy or hegemony of a great power over a particular area or group of 
states (Bull, 2002: 207). As mentioned before, action of this kind falls outside the jurisdiction 
of the UNSC, wherefore we will not operationalize the term, but at the most point out if China 
should voice criticism because of another great powers’ local preponderance. Regarding a 
great power condominium, when reading Bull it can be discussed whether the UNSC in 
contemporary times constitutes a great power condominium in his  terminology: 
 
“Great powers may be thought to contribute to international order by 
agreeing, not upon a division of the world into spheres of influence, 
interest or responsibility, but to join forces in promoting common policies 
throughout the international system as a whole” (Bull, 2002: 218). 
 
From this, one can argue that the UNSC is the embodiment of this promotion of common 
policies, and that it to a large extent can preserve the political status quo of the great powers. 
Therefore, we argue that it is not directly necessary for the great powers to establish a concert 
or condominium outside the UN at present time, and if this was the case, it falls outside the 
scope of this project. 
Whichever way one interprets Bull’s writing on great power condominium,  we argue that the 
behavior or action taken to uphold a great power condominium, would be the same as the one 
applied to uphold the general balance of power and international order. This entails that it 
would be redundant to operationalize Bull’s thoughts on a great power condominium, and 
that in terms of great power management, the behavior establishing this concept will be 
inherent in the others. Therefore, in light of the goals of our research, what we define as the 
behavior the great powers can demonstrate in managing their relations with one another is: 
 
                                                 
6
Article 39 and 49 in Chapter VII.  
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 Preservation of the general balance of power   
 Avoidance and control of crises 
 Limitation of war 
 Spheres of influence 
 
As mentioned previously, these concepts are a formulation, or description, of how the great 
powers can choose to behave (Bull, 2002: 200p.). This implies that we must create a range of 
indicators hinting when these concepts are being applied in the selected cases. As the 
following operationalization clarifies, the degree to which, and no t least how, China have 
applied these concepts throughout the cases, will discern a general pattern, showing how 
China has managed their great power status, in relation to their stance on humanitarian 
intervention. 
  
Operationalization  
Since we examine China’s position on humanitarian intervention through their behavior in the 
UNSC, we must base our indicators on the possible channels through which this behavior can 
be displayed. We identify this as the UNSC voting system, and the rhetoric and official 
statements following this. The UNSC voting system allows each of the 15 members a vote on 
issues of peace and security, and the five permanent Security Council members the right to 
veto any resolutions (UNSC, 2013a). Meetings regarding issues concerning the international 
peace and security can be called at any time, and demands verbatim coverage, being 
documents including all statements and speeches made during the meeting (UNSC, 2013b). It 
is this verbatim coverage, besides the actual votes, that we will scrutinize in order to capture 
when, how, and why China behave in accordance with the great power management theory. 
Therefore our procedure in examining the cases that we have selected, will be, firstly, to 
identify the relevant resolutions in the case, this will be the ones relation to Chapter VII. 
Secondly, we will proceed to investigate how China voted on the resolutions, and relate this to 
our indicators of great power management behavior. To support this observation we will 
scrutinize the verbatim coverage connected to the particular resolution, or the case in general, 
again in connection to our indicators of great power management7. Our conclusions will 
                                                 
7In relation to R2P we will proceed in the same vein, albeit not by scrutinizing resolutions, but by examining 
other types of official documents and statements regarding the implementation of R2P. These documents, such 
as the WSOD will also have had verbatim coverage, and therefore it is possible to examine R2P in a manner 
consistent with our general research procedure.  
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therefore be based on both the action and behavior of China in the UNSC. In terms of judging 
when China manages their great power in accordance with each outlined behavior, this will be 
a wholly interpretive matter. The scholars more inclined to a ‘scientific’ or positivistic 
research tradition will most likely object to this, but here we adhere to Bull’s a rgument of 
judgment in International Relations. On this he argues that the main questions of 
International Relations theory, such as those of intervention and sovereignty, are of such a 
moral and normative character, that these cannot be given any objective answer (Bull, 1966: 
366). Not only in building hypotheses and frameworks to answer these, but also in testing 
them are scholars of International Relations dependent on judgment and intuition (ibid.).  
 
Furthermore, since the main body of our empirical material consists of statements and 
rhetoric from various official documents, a scientific approach including numerical indicators 
and what Bull refers to as ‘strict standards of verification’, would be difficult to apply at best 
(Bull, 1966: 361). Rather we base our operationalization on the following argument from 
Bull’s text ‘International Theory: A case for the Classical Approach’, on International Relations:  
 
“..that general propositions about this subject must therefore derive from 
a scientifically imperfect process of perception or intuition, and that these 
general propositions cannot be accorded anything more than the 
tentative and inconclusive status appropriate to their doubtful origin”  
(Bull, 1966: 361). 
 
Therefore, the answers emanating from our framework and operationalized great power 
management behavior will be historically contingent, based on interpretations in accordance 
with the nature of our problem formulation8, and the empirical material we have gathered.  
 
As mentioned in the conceptualization, Bull states that the ways great powers contribute to 
the international society, is through management of their relations and by exploiting their 
preponderance. These contributions are highly interconnected (Bull, 2002: 201). We 
therefore recognize that the indicators of the types of behavior, conceptualized from his 
                                                 
8Since our problem formulation concerns a fundamental and normative value conflict in International Relations, 
the balance between state sovereignty and intervention, it is following Bull’s terminology, only answerable in a 
subjective manner, as should any question of international relations be (Bull, 1966: 366).  
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theory as they are, will to some extent overlap. This can be exemplified through the great 
power duty of preserving the international order, which is referring to the first behavior, or 
contribution, which again is an indicator of one of the other behaviors.  
 
In the following paragraphs, we will operationalize the systematized concepts of great power 
management into indicators of behavior. More specifically, these indicators will be applied on 
the cases of humanitarian crises in the post-Cold War era, with focus on the voting behavior of 
China and the rhetoric following the votes. This enables us to judge the behavior of China 
through Bulls theoretical framework, in accordance with to which degree, and by which 
arguments, they follow the outlined behaviors. Hence, the closer China acts in accordance 
with these indicators, the more precisely we can discern a general pattern of behavior.  
The following behaviors have three indicators each, representing the three different options 
of either vetoing, abstaining or accepting UNSC resolutions.   
Concretely, we will be looking for behavior of how: 
 
(1) China is preserving the general balance of power through:                     
 Condemning hegemonic or unilateral actions of other great powers or in general 
criticism of actions taken outside UNSC jurisdiction. These arguments will be 
conducted because it renders the veto power useless which is a great power right. 
Moreover, such behavior would disrupt the international order, which all great powers 
are working to preserve, a great power duty.         
 Acceptance or abstention of resolutions obviously in conflict with the traditional 
Chinese view on sovereignty and non-interference in order to uphold or not disturb 
the general balance. This could for instance be acceptance of a Chapter VII resolution 
on the grounds that the conflict is threatening international peace and security.  
 Veto of resolutions concerning domestic crises. This could be China arguing that the 
crisis is not posing a threat to the international peace and security, with a reference to 
state sovereignty. 
 
(2) China is avoiding and/or controlling the humanitarian crisis at hand. This 
entails that China either need to: 
 Refraining from intervening unilaterally within one another’s spheres of influence.  
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 Abstaining, instead of vetoing, Chapter VII resolutions that clearly violates the Chinese 
principles of sovereignty and nonintervention, as a way of modifying its policies to 
avoid a political crisis, which initially could disrupt the international order. 
 Acceptance of resolutions which does pose a threat to the international peace and 
security, while arguing that interventions should only be conducted with a UNSC 
authorization. Moreover acceptance as avoidance of crisis can include a modification of 
policies. 
 
(3) China acts to limit war, through: 
 Attempts to reduce misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the great powers words 
and actions, referred to as friction. We will look for these attempts in the statements 
connected to resolution votes. This could for example be explaining a veto, so as to 
make the reasons for the action perfectly clear. 
 Abstaining resolutions as attempts to manage and direct the relationships of the lesser 
powers with one another and with the great powers. Given the nature of contemporary 
conflicts this could be handling of intra-state war by diplomatic means such as 
negotiation with the legitimate parties, sanctions etc. Hence, we will be looking for 
arguments concerning diplomacy as a way of containing war, rather than military 
intervention.  
 Vetoing with the argument that the intervention would do more harm than good. 
These arguments could also be seen along with abstentions. Abstention, however, will 
in this context be influenced by a modification of policies to avoid political crisis.   
 
(4) China is respecting and claiming spheres of influence:  
 Spheres of influences can be rhetorically claimed by great powers, or belonging to a 
certain great power due to geographical proximity. This could be statements 
concerning the protection of weaker states from UNSC intervention.  
 Conceding what Bull refers to as a ‘free hand’. This could be agreeing to and abstaining 
on resolutions concerning crisis in spheres of influence that are not China’s. This 
implies a willingness on the part of each other to disinterest itself entirely in what the 
other power does within its spheres, so long as this  disinterest is reciprocal. This also 
shows respect of other’s sphere of influence.   
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 A veto on a resolution with a Chapter VII mandate can be argued not to be appropriate 
in one’s own sphere of influence. Through arguments such as ‘out of respect for state 
sovereignty’, a state can seek to protect their sphere of influence, while taking 
measures to solve the crisis without the influence of the international society, and 
hence establish a negative sphere of influence. 
 
Having presented these great power management behaviors, we will now proceed to the 
analysis where these indicators, which constitute the theoretical framework, will be applied 
to our selected case.  
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3. The Analysis 
This chapter will address research question one and two. Firstly, we will outline China’s 
traditional stance on state sovereignty, and how this affects its contemporary position on 
humanitarian intervention. Secondly, we will define China’s responsibilities as a great power 
through Bull’s definition, and add contemporary arguments to sustain this. Finally, we will 
analyze China’s position towards humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era, divided 
into the periods; 1990-1999, 2000-2006 and 2007-2013.  
 
The Origins of the Chinese Traditional Stance on State Sovereignty  
This sub-chapter seeks to account for China’s history, and hence the orig ins of China's stance 
on non-intervention. It does so by summarizing China’s history and crucial events that seems 
to have affected China’s approach to this issue in international politics. We will thus answer 
the first research question as a conclusion to this paragraph. 
 
Throughout history, China has emphasized the principle of non-intervention as a right that 
ought to be recognized and respected. This stance is originally derived from China’s oldest 
strategic writer, Sun Zi, who has conceptualized the use of force in The Art of War. According 
to Zi, war is a necessary evil as it destroys the “cosmic harmony of the universe” (Xia, 2013: 4).  
 
In China’s early history as an empire, it had a somewhat interventionist approach, though, as 
the Chinese emperor “enjoyed a latent right of intervention” (Lawson & Tardelli, 2013: 1248). 
In 1839 China’s empire started to collapse and its territorial control decreased with a third, 
and the emperor lost his right of intervention. This was caused by the first opium war, when 
the British government forced China to open up for the opium trade (Newsinger, 1997: 37). 
China refused, which resulted in repeated interventions by other powers. Hence, China’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity was violated time and again, causing domestic chaos. This 
chaos was characterized by a series of uprisings, which turned into civil war. These internal 
conflicts was dampened in 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party gained power and 
founded the People’s Republic of China (Davis, 2011: 225, Kaufman, 2010: 2). This signaled a 
new era for China as what is referred to as the Century of Humiliation came to an end. China’s 
new leader Mao Tse-tung marked this by declaring: “China has finally stood up” (Kaufman, 
2010: 11).   
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The Century of Humiliation has had a great impact on China’s foreign policy and its relations to 
the international society. The century had created a strong identity in Chinese culture and a 
strong will to prevent any recurrence of a similar humiliation through a strong defense  of 
sovereignty (Davis, 2011: 278). Chinese leaders use the memory of humiliation as an 
argument for being wary of close relationships with the international society (Kaufman, 2010: 
11).   
 
During the Cold War, China assisted liberation groups in the third world such as in Angola, 
indirectly intervening through the provision of arms and supplies. This kind of indirect 
intervention was often covert and limited, and argued to be in the defense of sovereignty 
(Lawson & Tardelli, 2013: 1248p.). However, China’s  approach became more progressive as it 
intervened directly in Korea, and supported North Vietnam in its fight against the US. China’s 
intervention in Korea was based on strategic concerns as well as ideological beliefs. The 
following attack on Vietnam was planned both to counter the Soviet’s influence in Indochina, 
and to punish Vietnam for having intervened in Cambodia, which was China’s ally in the 
region (Lawson & Tardelli, 2013: 1249). Even so, though China did not refrain from 
intervening in the affairs of other states during the Cold War, they did so on a much more 
limited scope and a less frequent scale than for instance the Soviet Union and the US (ibid.). 
Furthermore, Vietnam came to represent China’s last unilateral intervention during the Cold 
War (ibid.).   
 
In the early 1950’s, China articulated its non-interventionist position in the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence, which now is enshrined in China’s constitution, and therefore still today 
plays a significant role in China’s foreign policy. The five principles include: respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in other state’s 
domestic affairs, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful coexistence in diplomatic relations, and 
exchange economically and culturally with other countries (Preamble to the Chinese 
Constitution, 1982).  These principles were to serve as a guideline to Chinese foreign 
relations, illustrating China’s firm stance on state sovereignty.  
 
China’s strong emphasis on peaceful coexistence was once again reinforced with the US 
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military intervention in the Taiwan Straits9, under the pretext of helping to democratize 
Taiwan, and the convent support of the 1959 uprising in Tibet10 when it revolted against 
China. However, in the same period, China took the first steps towards a more flexible and 
permissible policy of legitimating foreign interventions, if these were guided by the consent of 
the host state (Copper, 2001: 491, Anand 2009: 30, Davis, 2011: 225, Lawson & Tardelli, 
2013: 1249).   
 
In 1971, China replaced Taiwan in the UN and the Security Council, and continued its strict 
policies on sovereignty and nonintervention. This was reflected in refusals to participate in 
UNSC deliberations or votes on peacekeeping, let alone financial donations to UN missions 
(Davis, 2011: 226). With this new position, China had officially joined the international society 
on equal terms, a token of China’s increasing power (Buzan, 2010: 9). This position enabled 
China to retake their position as the protector of the third world (Bull, 2002: 286, Davis, 2011: 
280). This is also reflected in a present context, by China’s relation to Africa and their 
relational governance. China is regarded to be the actor within the international society to 
have had the greatest impact on African development in the 21st century (Large, 2013: 707 
p.).  
 
In the 1980’s, Deng Xiaoping launched a Reform and Opening program, which widened China’s 
relation to the international society, and indicated a slight liberalization of China’s stance on 
sovereignty and non-intervention. The Reform and Opening programme additionally indicated 
that China’s internal affairs to a lesser degree was influenced by the international society’s 
pressure, but on the contrary, determined by China itself. Ho wever, the Tiananmen Square 
protests in 198911 crippled this development, and the traditional Chinese stance on state 
sovereignty was once again reinforced (Davis, 2011: 227, Buzan, 2010: 12).  
In the 1970’s and 1980’s, China was driven by international development. This manifested 
itself in profound changes of national identity, strategic culture12, and the definition of China’s 
security interests, all of which have transformed its relationship with the international 
society. This entailed that China was now widely accepted as an equal state by the 
                                                 
9 China was trying to reunite Taiwan with the mainland of China, and thus claimed it as its sphere of influence 
(Copper, 2001: 490, Davis, 2011: 280). Hence, any intervention in Taiwan would be a disregard for China’s 
territorial integrity. 
10 Tibet was then, as it is now, considered to be China’s sphere of influence (Anand, 2009: 30)  
11 Student led demonstrations for a more democratic China (Hershkovitz, 1993: 395p.).  
12 Strategic culture is in simplified terms when basic contents of society is identified by the state, and used to 
form a strategy of how to react to interstate affairs and international conflicts (Yaqing, 2003: 214).  
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international society, and had to recognize the values of this society, such as human rights and 
global governance. Originally, these values conflicted with its firm stance on non-intervention. 
However, it was necessary for China to modify these in order to protect its new established 
role in the society. Concretely, China had to transform its security interest from a ‘military -
political-territorial’ one, into a more cooperative, ‘comprehensive security’ one that stressed 
the importance of maintaining stability, and participation in the global political economy 
(Buzan, 2010: 9pp.). This led to a somewhat more liberal approach towards intervention by 
the year of 1991, which can be emphasized in the following quote fro m  the Chinese Human 
Rights White paper:   
 
”China has always held that to effect international protection of human 
rights, the international community should interfere with and stop acts that 
endanger world peace and security (...)” (Information Office of the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China, 1991: Chapter X) . 
 
Though, China stressed that this was not a green light for states to abuse the issue of human 
rights to promote its own values and ideologies, or infer these in particular on developing 
countries (Davis, 2011: 227). The historical impact of the Century of Humiliation on Chinese 
behavior in international society is still evident in contemporary times, embodied by Chinese 
critique of ‘might is right’ politics, where the strong imposes their will on the weak (ibid.).  
 
With this established, we are now able to conclude on our first research question. We asked: 
What is China’s traditional stance on state sovereignty, and what is its origin? Through this 
somewhat brief account of China’s history, we can determine that China has a rather firm 
stance on humanitarian intervention. This is rooted in China’s Century of Humiliation in which 
it was subject to interventions repeatedly. In order to prevent any reoccurrence, China’s 
foreign policy has been guided by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, namely, respect 
for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, and non-interference.  
However, tendencies of an interventionist approach were identified in China’s history as well, 
although on a lesser scale and frequency than great powers such as the Soviet Union and the 
US (Lawson & Tardelli, 2013: 1248). Furthermore China’s last unilateral and direct 
intervention was in Vietnam, which took place in the last period of the Cold War. This shows, 
that China has not fundamentally changed its traditional stance on intervention, only modified 
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it to fit with the international society. Therefore, we believe that these suggestions of an 
interventionist approach are not characteristic for China’s position on humanitarian 
intervention. 
 
Hence, when we refer to China’s traditional stance throughout the rest of this study, we refer  
namely to China’s historic adherence to state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non -
aggression and non-interference, rooted  in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and the 
experiences of the Century of Humiliation. This, we believe, is what characterizes China’s 
approach to humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era.   
 
With the origin and definition of China’s stance on intervention determined, and thereby 
having answered our first research question, we will now establish China as a great power 
within Bull’s definition.   
 
China as a Great Power 
It is in our problem formulation stated that China possesses great power responsibilities. We 
therefore need to address that assumption, and will in this paragraph will investigate 
research question two and define China as a great power and establish the responsibilities 
that follows. This will be done through a concrete definition of great power status, derived 
from Bull’s great power management theory. 
 
In the conceptualization and the systematized concepts, we have already established Bull’s 
definition of great powers. We will now apply this systematized concept in order to define 
China as a great power. Bull already in 1977 established China as a great power, along with 
the US and the Soviet Union. Following his own criteria, he concluded that they all possessed a 
“similar standing in world politics” (Bull, 2002: 197). However, China did not possess as great a 
military strength as the US and the Soviet Union. It could still be characterized as a great 
power, though, as China had rhetorically taken the duties of representing the lesser states, 
and because of:  
 
“China’s status as a nuclear power, a member of the United Nations 
Security Council, a donor of foreign aid, and above all as a power willing 
to reach a political settlement with the United States on the basis of 
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equality, and in disregard of the interests of its small power associates, all 
these indicate the behaviour of a member of the great power club” (Bull, 
2002: 197 pp.).  
 
If we use the same arguments in a contemporary context, we will reach the same conclusion: 
China is a great power. We base this on China’s political willingness to improve their 
relationship with all nations, including the US (Bijan, 2005: 21), which Bull identifies as a 
requirement for China to be a great power. Furthermore, China still has strong military 
capabilities, which is reflected in China’s military spendings. These have only but risen in the 
post-Cold War era, and it has risen steeply. China’s military power is further emphasized by 
Pentagon’s recognition of China as the only challenge to the unipolar power of the US  (Chen 
and Feffer, 2009: 48 pp.). Thus, reaffirms Bull’s requirement of great powers being somewhat 
equal in status. It further suggests that China is being recognized by the international society 
as a great power. With this recognition comes special rights, which is evinced in China still 
being a prominent permanent member of the UNSC, thereby holding the right to veto (UN, 
2013, UNSC, 2013b). This determines China’s membership in the great power club, which we 
in chapter two, established the UNSC to be the locus for. Holding the right to veto, gives China 
the possibility to shape the policies within the international society. Besides this role in the 
Security Council, China has also proved its status by increasing its participation in UN 
peacekeeping operations, and being a donor of foreign aid (Woods, 2008: 1205, Davis, 2011: 
281). This can further be reflected in China’s negotiations to become a member of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). China emphasized that it would not be an inferior actor in the 
international society and stated: “We know we have to play the game your way now but in ten 
years we will set the rules” (Bergsten et al., 2008: 9). Therefore, China’s role cannot be ignored 
nor underestimated. 
 
 
All these facts, in combination with Bull’s definition of China as a great power in the 1970’s, 
helps us to establish China’s status as a great power, both in practice and in Bull’s 
terminology. Figuratively speaking, China would be accepted in the great power club, if it 
were to apply for a new membership. Our observations can further be sustained by a range of 
scholars, who have reached the same conclusion. One scholar, who has stressed the same, is 
Jonathan Davis. He too identifies a shift in China’s rhetoric regarding its role in the 
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international society. He further recognizes China’s growth both economically and militarily, 
and highlights China’s membership in the Security Council as a warrant for its position as a 
great power (Davis, 2011: 218pp.). Others scholars include Bergsten et al., Garwoo d-Gowers, 
Cheng and Zhang, Sceats and Breslin, and Buzan who all emphasize either China’s growth or 
its role in the international society (Bergsten et al., 2008: VII, Garwood-Gowers, 2012: 9, 
Cheng & Zhang, 1999: 91, Sceats & Breslin, 2012: 1, Buzan 2010: 5). Buzan even goes as far to 
characterize China’s rise as a given and further argues: “China has now risen enough that it 
cannot avoid the responsibilities that go with power” (Buzan, 2010: 36).  
 
Concluding from the above, we consider China to be a great power. However, this status does 
not come without costs. As already explained in chapter two, great powers have 
responsibilities; the foremost being preserving the international order. For China, this entails 
that it has to preserve this order by maintaining the balance of power with its fellow great 
powers. Furthermore, China can act as to control or avoid crises and limit war. Another way of 
preserving the international order is by establishing spheres of influence, and respecting 
other power’s sphere of influence. Lastly, a great power’s responsibility also implies a right to 
influence and shape policies within the international society. Though, this has to be based on 
the wishes of the international society, wherefore these must be taken into account. China 
thus has to strive for securing the international order through the above mentioned behavior. 
In the following sections we will analyze China’s position towards humanitarian intervention 
in the post-Cold War era, where we will be looking for different types of behavior in order to 
establish a general pattern of China’s behavior. 
China’s Stance on Humanitarian Interventions in the 1990’s 
This part examines China’s positioning on humanitarian intervention in the period 1990 – 
1999. It does so by analyzing China's acts and official statements in connection with five 
humanitarian crises of the 1990's: 
 
 
1.  Iraq  
2.  Somalia    
3.  Haiti    
4.  Rwanda    
5.  Kosovo    
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Iraq 
After the 1991 Gulf War and consequent US expulsion of Iraqi forces in Kuwait, the US, UK and 
France established no fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. Both no fly zones were 
established without direct UN authorization. The zones were justified by combining 
resolution 678, authorizing UN members to 'use all necessary means', with resolution 660, to 
'effect the withdrawal of Iraqi forces in Kuwait' (UNSC, 1990). These two resolutions were 
coupled with resolution 688, demanding an immediate end to Saddam Hussein's repression of 
Iraq's civilian population (Davis, 2011: 227p.). 
 
China voted in favor of resolution 660, demanding Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from 
Kuwait, but abstained from voting on resolution 678, which authorized military action to 
enforce resolution 660's demand (Davis 2011: 228 p.). This abstention shows Beijing's 
reluctance to endorse UNSC authorization of the use of force by member states under Chapter 
VII, aligning Chinese behavior with Walzer’s argument that stresses on exhausting all 
diplomatic and peaceful measures before using force (Walzer, 2006: 84). China also abstained 
on resolution 688, a resolution calling upon Saddam Hussein to end the repression of Iraq's 
civilian population. During this period China expressed concern for the humanitarian 
situation in Iraq, while also objecting that resolution 688 violated the principle of non-
interference enshrined in article 2(7) of the UN Charter stating: ”The Security Council should 
not consider or take action on questions concerning the internal affairs of any state” (UNSC, 
1990). 
 
This objection fits well into the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, obviously the non-
interference principle and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity in particular. The 
reason to abstain may relate back to domestic affairs. China could have been concerned with 
the willingness of the UNSC to consider the external effects of an internal repression, which 
could be set as a precedent applicable in Taiwan or the Tiananmen Square protests. In 
essence, the statement illustrates the firm stance on sovereignty that China held in the early 
post-Cold War period. However, in contrast to what the rhetoric might imply, instead of 
vetoing they abstained. Besides having the relative recent Tiananmen Square protests in 
mind, Chinese behavior on the Iraq resolutions seem to fit perfectly the indicator of  'free 
handing'. In Bull’s terms this is defined as a state disinteresting itself from the activities the 
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other state conducts within its sphere of influence (Bull, 2002: 214). Bull also underlines, that 
this only happens so long as the disinterest is reciprocal (ibid.). This, suggest that China might 
have seen a benefit in not vetoing resolution 678 and 680, in the hope that it would avoid any 
chance of US vote in favor of an interference in Chinese domestic affairs.  
 
In this regard it is important to mention that the early post-Cold War years saw a process of 
US primacy of a kind, that if measured on capabilities, made them seem almost 'alone in the 
world' (Clark, 2011: 19). This also explains why there was no immediate objections to the no 
fly zones at their time of establishment, although over time China did issue statements on its 
'serious concern' with Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (Davis, 2011: 230). According 
to Bull’s writings on the general balance of power, the Chinese criticism following the fact that 
the no fly zones were established without direct UN authorization should come as no surprise. 
This is because action taken outside UNSC jurisdiction undermines China’s right to veto, and 
thereby their great power right to determine issues that is essential to the international order 
(Bull, 2002: 196).  
 
In terms of great power management, the behavior of China implies a respect for US sphere of 
influence and the international order, not least because resolution 688 was unprecedented. It  
was the first time the UNSC declared a humanitarian crisis a threat to international peace and 
security, and it was the first Chapter VII mandate since Korea13. Following Bull, this reference 
to international peace and security implies that the Iraq case was a threat to the international 
order, and the balance of power, whereby it became the duty of the great powers to resolve 
this threat (Bull, 2002: 206). In general the Iraq case illustrates two interesting things that is 
possible to discern when applying Bull’s theory of great power management. One is how 
China understandably criticized US preponderance embodied by the establishment of the no 
fly zones, since this undermined a basic great power right. Two is how they avoided 
disrupting the general balance of power, by managing their great power relations with the US, 
to the effect that they let every resolution on Iraq pass. This illustrates how China both asserts 
they traditional foreign policy principles, while almost simultaneously disregarding these by  
letting resolutions pass that clearly violates them, for the good of the international order.  
 
                                                 
13 This has since been viewed as heralding a new age of humanitarian intervention and collective security 
(Cockayne & Malone, 2006: 126). 
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Somalia 
In terms of China's view on humanitarian intervention their voting behavior on Somalia is 
quite interesting. In fact, China supported all UNSC resolutions on Somalia between 1992 and 
199414. Furthermore, they supported the groundbreaking resolution 794, the first Chapter VII 
authorization of the use of force without host state consent, and the first to do so on the 
ground on humanitarian concerns. This is especially interesting since it seemingly conflicts 
with China’s firm stance on non-interference. Chinese voting behavior on Somalia seems to fit 
the behavior of avoidance and control of crisis, hinting that China might have acted on behalf 
of securing the international order, when accepting a resolution aimed at controlling a crisis 
that 'constitutes a threat to international peace and security' (UNSC, 1992a). In Bulls words, 
what China does, by taking part in UNSC resolutions, is merely to play their role  as a great 
power, and thereby assert their right to take part in determining issues that affect the peace 
and security of the international system (Bull, 2002: 196).  
However, in supporting the resolution China made clear that its support was based on the  
unique and unprecedented situation due to the lack of a functioning government in Somalia. 
Also, as in the Iraq case, China stressed that it was concerned with the resolution authorizing 
the use force for humanitarian purposes (Davis, 2011: 231). 
In a rare support of this claim resolution 814, the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force 
authorized to undertake enforcement actions under Chapter VII, contained direct reference to 
the uniqueness of the situation in Somalia (UNSC, 1992b). Here it is important to remember 
the policy of permissible foreign intervention, which began in the 1950’s in China, focusing on 
state consent. This implies that Chinese support of resolution 794 and 814 was dependent on 
the lack of a functioning government, and hereby on the impossibility of gaining a host state 
consent. Based on this, it would be more precise to argue that China might be prepared to 
accept Chapter VII humanitarian interventions, thereby breaching their traditional principles. 
This seems to be in cases where state consent is achieved, or deemed impossible to achieve. 
However, the Somalia case does also indicate that the control or avoidance of crisis in the 
international society could supersede traditional Chinese principles of foreign policy, insofar, 
as these crises are handled collectively with UNSC authorization. This points to the 
conundrum that China as a great power is expected to participate in resolving crises that 
threatens the international order. However, in order to do so, China must violate the 
principles they normally so firmly adhere to. According to Bull, China, being a great power, is 
                                                 
14 17 resolutions, all but one passed unanimously. 
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under pressure from fellow states in the international society as they are: “thought by others 
to have the duty, of modifying their policies in the light of the managerial responsibility they 
bear” (Bull, 2002: 196). This explains why China supported resolutions on Somalia, but also 
why they made sure to point out that this was not a general acceptance of humanitarian 
intervention. 
 
Haiti 
In 1993 China and the UNSC adopted resolution 841, imposing a fuel and arms embargo on 
Haiti and freezing financial assets of the Haitian government. In the same vein as Somalia, 
China characterized the Haiti situation as 'unique and exceptional', this time referring to the 
fact that the exiled Haitian government had requested an intervention. Though, both in the 
case of Somalia and here Haiti, China publicly emphasized the fact that their acceptance 
should not be confused with a change in Chinese perception of the principle of non -
interference (UNSC 1993a). This apparent need to publicly voice their stance on intervention 
illustrates two things. Firstly, that the resort to humanitarian intervention reached a point 
where China might have felt threatened, at least on their principles. Secondly, this public 
statement can be a way of minimizing friction, and emphasize their right as a great power to 
determine issues that affect the peace and security of the international society as a whole 
(Bull, 2002: 196). Interpreted in this way China simply do not want other states to expect 
them to support interventions in general. Neither will they risk any misunderstandings, what 
Bull refers to as friction, compromising their relations with other states and great powers in 
particular. 
 
On July 31 1994, resolution 940 was adopted, authorizing a US led force to use all means 
necessary to facilitate the departure from Haiti of all military leadership. This mission also 
had the unprecedented aim to re-establish democracy in a member state. China abstained on 
this occasion, objecting to the Chapter VII invocation to use force. It underlined its concern for 
the resolution creating a dangerous precedent, and emphasized a preference of finding a 
peaceful solution over the resort to coercion (UNSC, 1994a). Th is goes in line with Bull’s 
argument that great powers will attempt to limit wars by, amongst other measures, managing 
the relationship of smaller powers with the great (Bull, 2002: 206). In the case of Haiti, China 
put stress on regional solutions and negotiations, in accordance with the indicator of limiting 
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war by putting diplomatic means before coercion. This priority also reaches back to the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, chiefly non-aggression.  
 
Nonetheless, China did not veto the resolution or as much as mention either sovereignty or 
non-interference principles in the UNSC debate on resolution 940 (UNSC 1993b). The most 
likely explanation for this is the fact that the Haitian government requested the intervention, 
in this way providing the element of consent. The case of Haiti adds to the previous examples 
in showing the Chinese will to accept humanitarian interventions, and that their view on non -
interference and sovereignty is somewhat flexible. 
From this, one can start to discern some general principles that China seems to have laid 
down in order to manage the issue of humanitarian intervention in their great power 
relations, whilst not eroding their traditional guiding principles completely. These principles 
so far seem to be: 
 
 The principle of consent before accepting any coercive measures 
 The principle of uniqueness, that no one case can set precedence for future action  
  
Rwanda 
Rwanda serves more as an example of non-intervention than of intervention. Initially, China 
voted for three Chapter VII resolutions, firstly creating the United Nations Assistance Mission 
for Rwanda (UNAMIR) peacekeeping force, secondly to reduce its size, and thirdly to expand 
its size. Resolution 929 adopted in June 1994, authorized a French led multinational fo rce 
under Chapter VII to use all necessary measures to achieve the humanitarian objectives. China 
abstained the resolution, claiming the conflict was a civil war and that negotiation between 
the parties was the only way of solving the crisis, underlining that resort to armed force or 
mandatory resources would only worsen the situation (UNSC 1994b). In terms of Bull’s great 
power management theory, the Rwanda crisis serves as an example of China's role in limiting 
war among lesser powers. As in the Haiti crisis, China emphasized peaceful means over 
coercive, which can be explained as an attempt at directing the affairs of the international 
society away from military intervention, and more towards traditional peacekeeping.  
China, demonstrating their preference for a traditional peacekeeping force over a member 
state led one, argued for a deployment of an expanded UNAMIR instead of authorizing a 
Chapter VII military intervention led by member state. This emphasis on what is commonly 
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referred to as ‘first generation peacekeeping’ entails intervening only on the consent of the 
inflicted parties, political neutrality, impartiality, the non-use of force except in self-defense 
and legitimacy from the UNSC (Miall et al., 2011: 149). These principles correspond quite well 
with the traditional Chinese stance on intervention, but were severely challenged in 
Rwanda15, where a peacekeeping force under an expanded Chapter VII mandate was 
authorized, although it never materialized (UNSC, 1999a). In addition to this China once again 
stressed the lack of consent of the conflicting parties to the deployment of a multinational 
force stating that it:  
 
“always believed (...) in securing the cooperation of all parties” and noting 
that “[s]uch cooperation is an indispensable condition  for the success of 
United Nations peace-keeping operations,”(UNSC 1994b).  
 
This emphasis on state consent and non-aggression in Rwanda is an example of how China 
uses their traditional foreign policy principles in their great power management of crises in 
the international society. Though, allowing the Chapter VII intervention to unfold, yet again 
shows a tendency to shy away from risking a disruption of the general balance of power.  
 
As Bull argues, the avoidance of crisis, including political ones, is one of the main functions of 
the great powers. The inherent risk of creating a political crisis by vetoing a Chapter VII 
resolution risk disrupting the balance of power, and thereby the international order. Although 
Bull argues that great powers might resort to creating conflict in order to disrupt the balance, 
in the cases examined so far China has continually refrained from attempts at this, apart from 
issuing critical statements. This was exemplified by the abstention on UNSC authorization of a 
member state led humanitarian intervention in Rwanda, even though voicing criticism against 
it (UNSC 1994b). This illustrates how China in the Rwanda crisis managed their great power 
relations in a manner consistent with the main great power responsibility. This is of course 
the preserving of the general balance of power, and the international order. However the 
Rwanda case did reveal Chinese attempts at directing the international society towards 
                                                 
15 Also the Implementation Force in Bosnia challenged the conception of first generation peacekeeping, by 
deploying a force capable of deterring aggressors under Chapter VII measures. In the middle of the 1990’s a 
general trend towards an expansion of the nature of UN peacekeeping erupted, challenging those who favored 
the methods of the first generation (Miall et al., 2011: 149 pp.). 
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handling crisis with traditional peacekeeping methods more in line with the Five Principles of 
Coexistence, although without luck.   
Kosovo 
In 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted a unilateral intervention in 
Kosovo marking the highpoint of Chinese resistance to humanitarian intervention. Not only 
did the NATO circumvention of the UNSC undermine China's great power right to have a stake 
in determining issues important to the international order, it also seriously tested China's 
stance on respect for state sovereignty and non-interference. 
China perceived the Serbian government to be defending its sovereignty against internal 
challenges, something China took very seriously given its own internal challenges to its 
sovereignty including Tibet and Taiwan (Davis, 2011: 247). Hence, China stood firm on the 
argument that Kosovo was a matter of the internal affairs of the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia:  
 
”Kosovo is a part of the [FRY], and respect for the [FRY’s] sovereignty and 
territorial integrity and noninterference in its internal affairs under any 
pretext are in conformity with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter” (UNGA, 1998a).  
 
In contrast to the previous cases China, along with Russia, threatened to veto any proposal for 
military action against Yugoslavia regarding the conduct of its own territory (Roberts, 1999: 
104). In terms of great power management China and Russia interpreted the NATO bombings 
in Yugoslavia as a threat to the international order, and saw the NATO offensive as a threat to 
the general balance of power. This can be seen rhetorically in how China condemned NATO's 
military actions, stating that NATO: 
 
“violated the purposes, principles and relevant provisions of the United 
Nations Charter, as well as international law and widely acknowledged 
norms governing relations between States” and furthermore noted: ”that 
NATO’s challenge to the Security Council’s authority “created an 
extremely dangerous precedent in international relations”  (Davis, 2011: 
248). 
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This statement illustrates a concern with the upholding of the international order, and that 
NATO might pose a serious threat to the general balance of power. In terms of China's 
management of their great power status, they supported a Russian resolution draft 
demanding immediate cessation of the use of force in Yugoslavia, and reopen ing of peace 
negotiations (UNSC, 1999a). In terms of our great power management behaviors, this can be 
interpreted as an attempt to limit war by containing a political dispute via negotiation (Bull, 
2002: 206). However, the resolution was not adopted, and only China, Russia and Namibia 
voted for. In arguing for their support of the resolution, a UN press release of the resolution 
meeting stated that Chinese delegate Qin Huasun had: 
 
”... said that the continued military strikes against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia by NATO, with the United States at the lead, had already 
caused severe casualties and damage. The situation in the Balkans had 
deteriorated. China strongly opposed such an act blatantly violating the 
principles of the Charter, as well as international law, and challenging the 
Council's authority” (UNSC, 1999a). 
 
Again, this statement can be related to preserving the general balance of power. If 
intervention can be conducted outside UNSC jurisdiction then Chinese veto power becomes 
obsolete, and therefore their position in the great power balance weakens. China’s fears are 
justified when looked upon in the light of Brown’s argument of all state’s actions are guided 
first and foremost by their self-interest and then any other reasons (Brown, 2010: 
314).However, Bull's outlining of the preserving of the general balance of power do suggest, 
that great powers sometimes must break international law to preserve the international 
order (Bull, 2002: 105). This entails that the US violated the UN Charter in order to reinstate 
international order, which generally comes before the requirements of international law 
(ibid.). 
 
Nonetheless, the Kosovo crisis saw China take a more assertive role in their great power 
management, and defend their principles of non-interference and state sovereignty. In fact, 
there were only two things hindering China from vetoing resolution 1244, a Chapter VII 
invokement authorizing member states to establish an international security presence in 
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Kosovo. The fact that the NATO bombing raids had ceased, and that Yugoslavia had accepted 
the peace plan inherent in the resolution (UNSC, 1999b). Furthermore, China made no 
attempt to hide their resent for intervention in the name of humanitarianism, arguing that the 
NATO intervention had seriously undermined the peace and security in the Balkans (ibid.). 
Therefore, Kosovo can be seen as a serious test of China's great power responsibilities and 
management, revealing a will to take a stake in the upholding of the international order. It 
also showed China asserting their great power responsibility, underlining that only by 
following the principles of non-aggression, non-intervention and diplomacy can international 
peace and security be achieved (UNSC, 1999c). 
 
Sub-conclusion: China’s Stance on Humanitarian Intervention in the 1990’s 
Overall, the examined cases have shown a number of interesting aspects about Chinese great 
power management in the first decade of the post-Cold War. First of all, several of the cases 
revealed that China adhered to their traditional principles of peaceful coexistence, when 
performing their great power duties. For example, both the Somalian and Haitian crises saw 
the curious case of China supporting several Chapter VII resolutions, while at the same time 
voicing criticism about these. This behavior illustrates two things: that China regards 
intervention on the grounds of humanitarianism, especially if carried out unilaterally by a 
member state, as undermining their great power right to have a say in matters concerning  
international order, and that it undermines the international order itself (UNSC, 1999c). 
Secondly, that China is flexible in terms of accepting resolutions that might violate their 
principles of non-aggression and non-interference, when they deem Chapter VII resolutions 
for the good of the international order. 
Additionally, China in the management of their great power status, seemed to adhere to 
avoiding or limiting war and crises by tools of diplomacy and non-aggression, instead of 
coercion. This is in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Lastly, the 
analysis of China’s behavior in the different cases seems to discern some general principles 
that guide their management of the issue of humanitarian intervention, in their great power  
relations. The principles identified so far is: 
 
  The element of consent in order to accept any Chapter VII intervention.   
  UNSC authorization of all Chapter VII military intervention   
  Limiting war by peaceful measures over coercion 
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  A principle of uniqueness, that no one case should set precedence for future 
   UNSC action.   
 
These principles are mostly similar to the traditional principles outlined in the beginning of 
the analysis, in particular the element of consent and non-aggression. This offers the 
interesting question of whether China is following these principles, as a way to navigate the 
international society they find themselves embedded in, whilst not eroding their traditional 
stance on state sovereignty and non-intervention. We will keep this question, and these 
preliminary conclusions in mind, as we move on to the period of 2000 – 2006.   
 
The Emergence and Acceptance of R2P and Darfur - 2000-2006  
In this part of the analysis, China’s behavior and official statements will be scrutinized in  
order to determine its stance on the efforts of redefining humanitarian interventions with the 
emergence of the doctrine of “the Responsibility to Protect”. Moreover, we will investigate the 
Chinese stance on the humanitarian crisis in Darfur.  
 
The Responsibility to Protect 
In 2001 The Canadian government financed the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which were to find a solution to the lack of action in situations 
like the ones in Rwanda and Srebrenica (ICISS, 2001a: VII). The result was the Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P) doctrine in which humanitarian intervention was reconceptualized, thereby 
trying to create a common consensus on the concept’s legitimacy (Roberts, 2001: 158).  
 
In 2005, the principles of R2P were adopted by the UN General Assembly at the World 
Summit. Prior to the emergence of the World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) containing 
the concept of R2P, roundtable meetings were arranged in 2001. At these meetings, Chinese 
representatives argued that humanitarian intervention was “a total fallacy” and that it did not 
have any legal basis under international law, especially not in the light of the Charter of UN’s 
restrictions on the use of force (ICISS, 2001b: 392). This reflects China’s strong stance again st 
intervention. At the roundtable meeting in 2001, China noted that human rights could not 
transcend state sovereignty, and objected to humanitarian intervention on a pragmatic level, 
arguing that interventions had proved:  
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“counterproductive to halting massive killings in targeted countries, for it 
can facilitate interventionists exploiting the legality for their own 
purposes and encourage warring parties inside a country to take an 
irresponsible stand in mediation processes” (ICISS, 2001b: 392).  
 
Alternatively, China strongly endorsed a concept of ‘Humanitarian Assistance’, which they 
argued to be “free of ulterior political motives” (ICIIS, 2001b: 393). They also suggested that 
Humanitarian Assistance should be defined with respect for state sovereignty, including the 
condition of obtaining all parties’ consent prior to undertaking humanitarian actions . 
Humanitarian Assistance has a range of similarities to China’s policies in the Rwanda crisis, 
where China emphasized first generation peacekeeping measures. The components of 
consent, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defense, are all present in what is 
referred to as the first generation of peacekeeping, established already in the 1950’s (Miall et. 
al., 2011: 149). Hence, Humanitarian Assistance is a clear reflection of China’s traditional 
stance, as it emphasizes the content of the Five Principle of Peaceful Coexistence, namely non-
aggression and respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Proposing this concept 
as an alternative to R2P could be translated, in Bull’s terminology, to that China is trying to 
avoid future crises, as it seeks to promote Humanitarian Assistance as the alternative 
approach to humanitarian intervention. Further, the proposition of Humanitarian Assistance 
signals that China is trying to collaborate with the international society on the issue of 
humanitarian intervention, by participating in the formation of the society’s policies (Bull, 
2002: 201p.). China had argued that the R2P was a fallacy and that it did not have any legal 
foundation in international law (ICISS, 2001b: 392). China has further argued that R2P did not 
recognize the right of sovereignty, wherefore it has voiced much criticism towards it (ICIIS, 
2001b: 392, Garwood-Gowers, 2012: 7). However, China’s proposition of Human Assistance 
suggests that China is acknowledging that the issue of humanitarian crisis needs to be 
addressed. Therefore, the Chinese alternative to R2P can be regarded as an invitation to the 
international society to negotiate the approach to humanitarian intervention. Thereby, it can 
be argued that China is trying to reach a diplomatic settlement on the issue of intervention, as 
is one of the ways a great power can behave in order to uphold the international order (Bull, 
2002: 206).    
However, in June 2005, in its position paper on UN reform including a section called “ The 
Responsibility to Protect”, China stated that:  
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“[e]ach state shoulders the primary responsibility to protect its own 
population,” but additionally acknowledged: “[w]hen a massive 
humanitarian crisis occurs (...) it is the legitimate concern of the 
international community to ease and defuse the crisis (Sceats & Breslin, 
2011: 38). 
 
This suggests that China had accepted, or acknowledged, the content of the  R2P doctrine. 
China thereby acknowledged that the international society has a responsibility to protect 
civilians if the sovereign state fails to do so itself, even though this will compromise the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the host state. In line with the previously examined 
cases China emphasize that intervention can only be approved by the UNSC (Sceats & Breslin, 
2011:38). In Bull’s terminology the acceptance of this concept relates to great power 
management behaviour of  modifying its policies to match that of the international society, in 
order to avoid or control crisis. Moreover, while exploiting its right to have a voice in matters 
that affect the international society as whole, China still held onto their traditional stance on 
the subject. This balance between modifying its policies to include the perspectives of R2P, 
while keeping their historical distance towards humanitarian intervention, was again evident 
in September 2005, where the WSOD was signed by all 191 nations. Here, China’ s president 
Hu Jintao argued that “we should all oppose acts of encroachment in other countries’ 
sovereignty, forceful interference in a country’s internal affairs, and willful use or threat of 
military force” (Davis, 2011: 262). However, China reaffirmed its acceptance of R2P in 
December 2005, but referred to it as a concept rather than an emerging norm (ibid.). In April 
2006, the UNSC incorporated the R2P doctrine into resolution 1674 by reaffirming 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the WSOD, a resolution which was unanimously adopted. 
Although China supported the resolution, it later asserted that the version of the R2P 
articulated in the resolution was:  
 
“not the same as the simple concept of the responsibility to protect, about 
which many countries continue to have concerns” and that it would be 
inappropriate “to expand, willfully interpret or even abuse this concepts,” 
which Resolution 1674 “only reaffirmed in principle … without any 
further elaboration” (Davis, 2011: 263p).      
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As this quote shows, China is displaying the same kind of ambiguity that our analysis of cases 
such as Somalia and Haiti shows, accepting a resolution that seems to contradict their 
traditional principles, while distancing themselves rhetorically.    
 
Darfur  
In December 2003, Darfur was declared “one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world” 
(UN News Darfur). In July 2004, UNSC took action and adopted Resolution 1556, declaring the 
situation in Darfur a “threat to international peace and security and to stability in the region” 
(UN SC/8160). The resolution was adopted under Chapter VII and endorsed the African 
Union’s (AU) proposed deployment of a protection force and imposed an arms embargo 
(UNSC, 2004). Resolution 1556 was adopted with a Chinese abstention, arguing that resolvin g 
the Darfur crisis required:  
 
“a comprehensive agreement based in the respect for the Sudan’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity” and continued: “China believe[s] 
that the Government of the Sudan bears primary responsibility for 
resolving the Darfur situation and that the international community 
should make every effort to assist the Government of Sudan” (UNSC 
2004a).  
 
This stance on the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, suggests that China’s emphasis on state 
sovereignty is still fundamental for its actions. Though, China could have chosen to veto the 
resolution but did not. This indicates that China is careful not to stir up its relationship with 
the international society, as argued by Bull, in the behavior of avoidance and control of crisis. 
China’s behavior regarding resolution 1556 is particularly interesting, as Darfur can be 
argued to be part of China’s sphere of influence. This argument can be sustained by the 
economic importance of China to Sudan, and their long standing diplomatic relationship 
(Large, 2008: 1pp.) The fact that China did not hinder outside interference within its own 
sphere of influence, shows that it is willing to uphold its great power responsibility and work 
to preserve the international order, instead of distancing itself from the international society.   
 
When the UNSC adopted resolution 1706 in 2006, China abstained again, accompanied by the 
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Russia and Qatar. Most interestingly, this resolution was the first to adopt the R2P mandate of 
taking ‘all necessary measures’ in accordance with resolution 1674 (UN SC/8821). As we 
discovered in the above, China supported resolution 1674, but abstained from its content in 
resolution 1706. The argument from China was, based on the language of the resolution, that 
the resolution only invited the Sudanese government to consent to the deployment of a peace 
operation. However, Chinese representatives time and again emphasized the resolution to 
require the consent of the host state (Davis, 2011: 268). Due to resolutions lack of impact, the 
pressure for Chinese action increased. This led to the Chinese president Hu Jintao visiting 
Khartoum, and successfully convincing the Sudanese government to give the UN peacekeeping 
mission its consent. This resulted in the unanimously adopted resolution 1769, in 2007, which 
mandated a hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur (Davis, 2011: 265, Hauss, 2010: 
195-196).  
 
China’s role in solving the problem of the crisis in Darfur has displayed interesting rhetoric 
and behavior, in relation to its great power management. China has been adhering to its 
traditional stance on sovereignty, wherefore it has stressed the importance of consent from 
the Sudanese government. Above we explained China’s decision to abstain on resolution 1556, 
through its great power duty of protecting its sphere of influence. When China accepted 
resolution 1769, it had diplomatically acquired the Sudanese consent, and had exploited its 
rights to voice its concerns on the matter. Moreover, it has showed that China do have an 
interest in solving humanitarian crisis within its own sphere of influence. However, it seemed 
to take international pressure for China to rise to this duty. In Bull’s terminology, China would 
under such situation have to modify its policies, as was also the case in Somalia in the 1990’s. 
In terms of our great power management behaviors, we argue that China did so in order to 
avoid or control the crisis, and in doing so asserted its right as a great power to determine 
issues that affect the peace and security of the international society. 
 
Sub-conclusion: The Emergence of R2P and Darfur - 2000-2006 
After the experiences in the 1990’s, the international society sought a way to conduct 
humanitarian intervention in a more efficient manner, than seen in the cases of Rwanda and 
Kosovo. In these cases China had continuously argued through its traditional stance on 
sovereignty and nonintervention. The emergence, and the Chinese acceptance of R2P in the 
WSOD and in resolution 1674, could leave one thinking that China’s firm stance ha d softened. 
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That was not the case. China had through the entire negotiation process held on to its 
traditional stance. What did change was its verbal formulation of what it initially meant. 
However, China displayed similar behavior in its position towards R2P, as in cases such as 
Haiti and Somalia, where it sought to balance between accepting resolutions contradicting its 
traditional stance, and criticizing these.  
 
Along the process of accepting the new R2P doctrine, we followed the management of the 
humanitarian crisis in Darfur. China abstained several times on the grounds of respecting 
state sovereignty and that an intervention was only possible with consent from the host state. 
Consent was not given until China took matters into its own hands, and made the Sudanese 
government provide them with consent, and thus made the way for at AU-UN peacekeeping 
mission. We saw that China was pressured by the international society to act, which in 
accordance with Bull, both showed a modification of policies, taking responsibility of its own 
sphere of influence and a way of controlling crisis so as to not disrupt the international order.  
Compared to the 1990’s, China have been emphasizing its traditional stance on state 
sovereignty. However, we have seen a tendency of modifying policies to match that of the 
international society, to a greater extent than we saw in the 1990’s. We can thus conclude that 
some of the same basic principles identified in the early post-Cold War period, played an 
important role in this period. These principles are:  
 
  The element of consent in order to accept any Chapter VII intervention.   
  UNSC authorization of all Chapter VII military intervention   
  Limiting war by peaceful measures over coercion 
 
In contrast to the 1990’s we did not identify the principle of ‘uniqueness’, but since we only 
examined one crisis we cannot rule it out as a guiding principle just yet. In the Darfur case, as 
well as in those throughout the 1990’s, these principles seem to be employed, in such a way, 
as to acquiesce to Chapter VII resolutions, while still being persistent on their traditional 
stances. Furthermore, these principles are interestingly in line with the UN Charter governing 
the UNSC, but at the same time resemble the traditional stance of the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence. We will now examine if these principles are to be traced in the last 
period of 2007-2013 as well.  
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China’s stance on Humanitarian Intervention in the 2007-2013 
This part examines China’s positioning on humanitarian intervention in the period 2007-
2013. It does so by analyzing China's acts and official statements in connection with four 
humanitarian crises:  
 
1.   Myanmar 
2.    Zimbabwe 
3.    Libya 
4.    Syria 
 
Myanmar 
Although Myanmar was not a case of Chapter VII intervention, the actions China took in 
relation to the case is of interest, in terms of great power management. This is because the 
UNSC failed to adopt a draft resolution, 2nd may 2008, on the situation in Myanmar due to 
vetoes from China and Russia. The resolution would have called on the government to not use 
violence against its ethnic minority, and urging them to initiate a political settlement through 
dialogue. The vetoes, however, blocked any action on the drafted measures to help the ethnic 
minority of Myanmar. China opposed the resolution by stating that:  “(...) the Myanmar issue is 
mainly the internal affair of a sovereign State. The current domestic situation in Myanmar does 
not constitute a threat to international or regional peace and security” (UNSC, 2007). In 
addition to this, China emphasized that they were an ‘immediate neighbor’ to Myanmar, and 
that they attached as much importance to the situation in the country as did any other state 
(ibid.). This initially goes in line with China’s traditional firm stance on state sovereignty, but 
also resembles the behavior of establishing a negative sphere of influence.  The statements 
definitively illustrate Myanmar as being within China’s geographical sphere of influence, but 
also underline their historical emphasis on non-aggression.  
 
The most interesting aspect of the Myanmar case by far though, is the fact that China used 
their veto right. Although it has been used on two prior occasions16, it was the first time in the 
2000’s that the veto right was invoked. China’s arguments for vetoing the resolution re-
establish Bull’s assigned behavior to great powers. Bull argues that one way to manage 
relations with other great powers, in order to maintain international order, is to avoid wars or 
                                                 
16 The two other occasions being Guatemala and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (See UN Veto list) 
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if it has already occurred to limit them (Bull, 2002: 206). However, China’s argument, that the 
Myanmar case did not resemble a threat to the international peace and security, warrants the 
question of whether the veto had more to do with establishing or keeping a negative sphere  of 
influence, or not destroying the basis for the already established diplomatic dialogue?  
Indeed the veto could be a preemptive way of ensuring that no greater conflict could erupt 
from an intervention or the threat of one. The cases of the 1990’s along  with Darfur do show, 
that diplomatic means instead of coercion has been a guiding principle of China’s stance on 
humanitarian intervention. It also shows, that when this principle has been breached, it has 
mainly been because of a threat to the international order, or because another principle, for 
example that of state consent, has been present. Therefore it makes sense for China to 
continue this course of non-aggression. The veto can be explained by the geographical 
proximity to Myanmar, and the negative sphere of influence that this state represents. 
However, the veto can also be interpreted as a way of deliberately manufacturing a political 
crisis, as Bull argues is not an uncommon desire for great powers (Bull, 2002: 202). He argues 
that great powers might take this path in order to secure a diplomatic victory, and this can be 
related to the indicator concerning minimizing friction. It cannot be denied that vetoing 
creates a tension and a focus on the state(s) responsible amongst the UNSC great powers. 
Therefore, the immediate Chinese veto in the Myanmar case, could be explained as a way of 
underlining that China’s own sphere of influence should not be meddled with by other great 
powers, unless the international order is at stake. By vetoing and bringing closer a political 
crisis, China seizes the opportunity to reinstate its firm respect for sovereignty, and its sphere 
of influence at the same time. Furthermore, China could by convincing the other UNSC 
members, that Myanmar does not represent a threat to  the international order, avoid the 
dilemma experienced in for instance the Somalia case, of whether to violate their traditional 
principles for the sake of the international order.  
 
Zimbabwe 
In 2008, the UNSC drafted a resolution supported by France, United Kingdom (UK) and the US, 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter against the government of Zimbabwe, perceived as a 
threat to international peace and security in the region. Although the draft did not impose 
military measures, only sanctions, China was against it on the grounds that:  
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“China has always believed that negotiation and dialogue are the best 
approach to solving problems on the international level. Lightly using or 
threatening to use sanctions is not conducive to solving problems” (UNSC, 
2008).  
 
China used their veto right to block the resolution, in a similar way as the Myanmar case. 
Again, the focus on diplomatic means is salient in Chinese rhetoric, as well as a focus on 
negotiation through regional bodies, such as the AU and Southern African Development 
Community. Instead of the UNSC resolution China supported a resolution adopted by the AU 
establishing dialogue and negotiation, stressing that the African countries’ position should be 
respected by the UNSC (UNSC, 2008). This is in line with our indicator of directing the 
relationship of lesser powers with the great powers, in this case attempting to align the UNSC 
with the regional attempts at containing the crisis.  
 
Another interesting aspect of the Chinese veto in Zimbabwe is that it was the second time it 
vetoed simultaneously with Russia. Consulting the UN’s official list of vetoes throughout its 
existence, China and Russia had never vetoed on the same resolutions until Myanmar, and 
now Zimbabwe (UN veto list). This could of course be due to coincidence, but it could also 
represent a larger motive concerning the general balance of power. Certainly the US’ rhetoric 
seems to infer a Russian - Chinese partnership, in stating: “Unfortunately, the Russian 
Federation and China blocked the adoption of this draft resolution for reasons that we think are 
not borne out by the facts on the ground” (UNSC, 2008).  
 
From this it seems that the US perceives Russia and China to be challenging the general 
balance of power, and the statement in general illustrates an example of what Bull refers to as 
‘friction’. China, Russia and the US are all invoking their great power duty and responsibility 
to prevent a conflict or crisis reaching a larger scale, and are all doing so by supporting the 
regional mediation effort (UNSC, 2008). However, where the US argue that the resolution 
would support regional negotiations, China and Russia argue that it would undercut them. 
This ironically, brings the great powers closer to an international political crisis, in trying to 
settle how to deal with what has not even been established as a regional crisis (ibid.).  
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This friction might be explained by Bull’s spheres of influence. China has had a long -standing 
relationship with Zimbabwe since 1979, and their military ties are among the closest on the 
African continent (Edinger & Burke, 2008: 5). This suggests, that Zimbabwe is within China’s 
sphere of influence, and that China, as any great power might seek to protect its sphere of 
influence. Therefore, China could have viewed the resolution as a threat to their relationship 
and influence in Zimbabwe, using the excuse that there was no threat to the international 
peace and security. This might be what the US implies by referring to ‘reasons we think are 
not borne out by the facts on the ground’ (UNSC, 2008).  
 
However, during the dialogue meeting between G-817 and developing countries in Hokkaido, 
African leaders had clearly stated their position against imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe, at 
the current stage. During the Council’s consultations, as mentioned earlier, many countries 
including China, urged the UNSC to respect the African position, and that more time and 
preference should be given to dialogues and the good offices mediation efforts (UNSC, 2008). 
This rhetoric indicates that China is keen on presenting itself as the leader of the African 
countries, by opting for regional solutions rather than opening the region to international 
intervention. In this way, one might suspect China for trying to establish Africa as part of their 
sphere of influence by protecting their right to sovereignty, and respecting their need to find 
‘African solutions to African problems’. Interestingly enough, no UNSC resolution has been 
adopted since the Zimbabwe resolution blockage, hinting that China and Russia by challenging 
the US, UK and France led resolution actually gained in Bull’s words, ‘a diplomatic victory’ 
(Bull, 2002: 202).  
 
Libya 
On 17 March 2011 the UNSC adopted resolution 1973, with ten votes for and 5 abstentions, 
being China Russia, Brazil, India and Germany (UNSC, 2011a). Authorizing member states to 
use all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under attack 
(ibid.). Resolution 1973 reinforced resolution 1970, also a Chapter VII intervention, initially 
supported by China. The 1970 resolution saw China reinvoke one of the main principles 
discerned throughout the 1990’s, that of uniqueness, explaining their support for the 
resolution with the ‘special circumstances’ surrounding the Libya case (UNSC, 2011b).   
 
                                                 
17 The two other occasions being Guatemala and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (See UN Veto list)  
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Regarding resolution 1973, it is noteworthy to point out that Russia and China once again was 
aligned. Both states had been skeptical towards resolution 1970, where China’s rationale as 
Alex Bellamy points out, was based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and a 
practical concern for questions such as, how a no fly zone were to be enforced (Bellamy & 
Williams, 2011: 843)? When NATO took on the task of enforcing the Chapter VII mandate both 
China and Russia responded with criticism, showing concern for the ‘arbitrary interpretation 
of the Council’s resolutions’ (UNSC, 2011c). This alignment could be interpreted as an attempt 
to challenge the balance of power in the UNSC, where the western states of the UK, US, and 
France all voted for the resolutions in Libya, as well as being part of NATO. But the fact that 
China abstained on resolution 1973, implies the same kind of flexibility as previously shown 
in Haiti and Iraq. Here the great power duty of resolving conflict or war reduced the principles 
of non-intervention and non-interference to criticism and rhetorical denunciations. This 
should also be seen in light of the fact that the military action in Libya came without host state 
consent, a principle strongly adhered to by China in previous cases. 
 
Also, the fact that regional bodies such as the League of Arab States (LAS) initially was in favor 
of resolution 1973, mounted pressure on opposing states such as China, who as we saw in the 
case of Zimbabwe, had previously stressed the importance of respecting the authority of 
regional organizations. Therefore China again faced the need to modify their policies in the 
face of a crisis, mounting a threat to the international order, as this UN press release 
illustrates: 
 
“the continuing deterioration of the situation in Libya was of great 
concern to China. However, the United Nations Charter must be respected 
and the current crisis must be ended through peaceful means. China was 
always against the use of force when those means were not exhausted (...) 
It had not blocked the passage of the resolution, however, because it 
attached great importance to the requests of the Arab League and the 
African Union (...) ” (UNSC, 2011d). 
 
Even though China in Myanmar and Zimbabwe had shown are more assertive stance towards 
humanitarian intervention, LAS' request of a no fly zone and safe areas in Libya provided 
China with no alternative but to let the resolution pass (Bellamy, 2011: 844). However, when 
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the LAS in the aftermath of the NATO bombings expressed their concerns about the expansion 
of the intervention,  it made possible a shift in Beijing’s stance (Swaine, 2012: 6). When the 
LAS’ secretary-general criticized the Western coalition of ´double standards´ and going 
beyond its original mandate, China quickly followed suit. Their criticism came in three 
different forms. The first was criticism of NATO's bombing, claiming that it caused civilian 
casualties, whereby China stressed an immediate ceasefire (Garwood-Gowers, 2012: 15). The 
second criticism was focused on how the western states exceeded the UNSC mandate, by 
focusing on government targets and providing arms to rebel forces, thereby inciting a regime 
change. Lastly, a strand of criticism focused on the R2P norm that was a part of resolution 
1973, and whether this was applicable to the Libyan situation. China did stress in a UNSC 
meeting regarding the protection of civilians in armed conflict that: “The responsibility to 
protect civilians lies first and foremost with the Government of the country concerned” . 
However, like the examples in the chapter concerning R2P, this was mostly a small rhetoric 
modification, as they at the same meeting stressed how they would not accept any attempts at 
regime change under the guise of protecting civilians (UNSC, 2011e). Especially the concern of 
NATO's exceedance of the UNSC mandate is interesting, as it risks endangering the general 
balance of power. This is mainly due to the fact that three out of five members of the UNSC are 
members of NATO, thereby having a direct influence on the execution of the mandate, leaving 
Russia and China without any control beyond rhetoric condemnation. There can be little 
satisfaction for a great power in fulfilling its right and duty to take a decision regarding a 
crisis, just to see that right being taken away from them by an outside actor. Furthermore, 
China's fear of cases setting precedence, as we witness numerous times in the 1990's, as well 
as their historic experiences with subjugation, could also play a big part in their reaction to 
the Libyan intervention. Nonetheless, China by abstaining instead of vetoing resolution 1973, 
proved flexible in their stance towards humanitarian intervention. Especially, considering 
how the resolution was executed without what we have found to be one of the basic pr inciples 
adhered to by China, that of consent. In fact, resolution 1973 was the first time the UNSC had 
authorized the use of force for civilian protection purposes, indicating that China lived up to 
their great power responsibility of contributing to the upholding of the international order. 
That being said, other explanations such as those stemming from scholars like Walzer and 
Roberts, should not be neglected either. China’s response to the Libyan crisis could also be 
explained by using Adam Robert’s argument that decisions to intervene or not to intervene, 
comes down to state interest. Hence, this is why state responses vary from case to case 
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(Roberts, 2001: 59, Brown, 2010: 314). Neither should it be ignored that China has very 
strong political and economic ties to regional bodies such as the LAS or the AU (Swaine, 2012: 
6). As Walzer points out: “Russia and China, who opposed the intervention, abstained on the 
final Security Council vote, perhaps because they can’t imagine an outcome that better suits 
their interests in the Middle East and Africa” (Walzer, 2011). Even so, the sharp criticism from 
China, and their lack of control over NATO's execution of the UNSC mandate, could see China 
becoming more assertive as a great power, particularly given the stake they have of 
determining issues affecting the peace and security of the international society.  
 
Syria 
The ongoing crisis in Syria, saw three vetoes from China along with Russia in the period 4 
October 2011 to July 2012. Not only does this constitute the third, fourth and fifth Chinese 
veto since 2007, it also illustrates what could now be referred to as a 'strategic partnership' 
(Xing, 2012). More interestingly, only one of the resolutions that were vetoed invoked Chapter 
VII. In addition to this the vetoes went against the wishes of the LAS, directly opposite of the 
emphasis we saw in Zimbabwe and Libya (Sceats & Breslin, 2012: 49). The argumentation for 
vetoing the Chapter VII resolution, emphasized the 'usual' defense of sovereign equality and 
non-interference, referring to how these norms are enshrined in the UN Charter. However, it 
also emphasized how China's purpose was to safeguard the interests of small and medium 
states in particular, and: ”to protect the role and authority of the United Nations and the 
Security Council, as well as the basic standards that govern international relations” (UNSC, 
2012). This quote illustrates how China attempted to direct the relations between the UNSC 
and the 'small and medium states', and of course Syria. Although, this resembles one of the 
ways of limiting war that Bull outlines, it almost did more harm than good, seeing how the 
continuous blockage of resolution drafts almost led the US to unilateral action (International 
Business Times, 2013). In 2013, when no progress was made UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
Moon stated his concern over US plans to launch a unilateral strike against Syria (Ibid.). The 
US plan to engage militarily because of the deadlock in the UNSC was perceived as a threat to 
the general balance of power by China and Russia. This eventually led to a US – Russian 
agreement preventing a unilateral attack and addressing the issue of disposing with chemical 
weapons (Al-Jazeera America, 2013). 
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There are several interesting elements of great power management to be discerned in the 
handling of the Syria crisis. First of all the effect of China's initial insistence on non -
interference and attempt at directing the affairs of the UNSC, saw the US countering with the 
threat of unilateral action. The continuing vetoes from both Russia and China was perceived 
as a disruption of the general balance of power by the US, and saw China assert themselves as 
a great power, possibly as a result of the Libya aftermath. The regime change in Libya could 
set a dangerous precedent for future Chapter VII action, and therefore China views the idea of 
an intervention in Syria with great skepticism. In Bull's terms this is most likely to come from 
their fear of not wanting to lose their stake in determining issues of importance to the 
international order, as witnessed in Libya and Kosovo. However, by threatening to use force 
the US deliberately brought the crisis closer to the point of war, forcing Russia and China to 
negotiate an agreement, thereby preserving the international order . However, it is also 
possible to see this the other way round, that China and Russia by blocking three resolutions 
in a row, forced the US to settle the Syrian crisis, or at least the UNSC political crisis 
diplomatically instead of militarily. 
 
This shows how China handle their great power responsibility by contributing to 
international order by limiting wars, if they have already occurred or preventing them 
altogether (Bull, 2002: 206). Michael Walzer reinforces this, when he argues that the use of 
force should always be the last resort, hence, it is better for the international society to 
maintain order through peaceful means (Walzer, 2006: 84).These arguments are similar to 
those of Robert Jackson’s who argues that it is the right of war without weighing  its risks and 
dangers, that should be questioned. He claims that going to war is a burdensome decision for 
political leaders and military commanders, as war is a brutal activity altogether. Then be it 
legitimate wars, just wars or humanitarian wars, they are equally capable of destruction as 
any other war (Jackson, 2010: 317p.). However, China might have asserted themselves in the 
Syrian case to emphasize a non-military solution, but had by challenging the general balance 
of power in their partnership with Russia, almost created a political crisis. In addition to this, 
they compromised their normal emphasis on regional cooperation by going against the 
wishes of the LAS. 
It is crucial to underline that China, by vetoing, did not refrain from the principles g uiding 
their management of humanitarian intervention, that we have discerned in the previous cases, 
that being state consent, UNSC authorization of military measures, limiting war by peaceful 
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means, and the principle of uniqueness. Therefore it should not come as a surprise that China 
has not yet accepted a Chapter VII agreement in Syria. That being said, resolutions has been 
accepted since the Russia – US agreement, but these have included first generation 
peacekeeping measures at the most, not unlike the ones described in the Rwanda case, and 
have not been Chapter VII enforcements (UNSC, 2012b, UNSC, 2012c, UNSC 2012d, UNSC, 
2013c). 
 
Sub-conclusion: China’s stance on Humanitarian Intervention in the 2007-2013 
This last part of the analysis has seen China to a larger degree adhering to its traditional 
stance, when it comes to authorizing interventions. This trend was evident when China vetoed 
both the resolutions on Myanmar and Zimbabwe. In Myanmar, China argued that the crisis 
was an internal matter of the country, and so they would not meddle in the internal affair of 
any country, in any way. In Zimbabwe, the argument was that other options than intervention 
were available at that point in time, and hence, they would prefer utilizing those before 
considering intervention. The analysis indicated that Myanmar and Zimbabwe could be 
described as part of China’s sphere of influence, stemming from geographical proximity, 
rhetorical statements protecting and supporting regional solutions, and historical 
agreements. In contrast to this, the Libyan case saw China continue their path, laid out in the 
1990’s of abstaining on Chapter VII resolutions, although seemingly in conflict with their 
traditional principles. This initially hinted a widening of Chinese flexibility since the Chapter 
VII mandate came without host state consent, but the NATO enforcement of the mandate saw 
China respond with heavy criticism and concern. This seemed to affect China’s stance on the 
Syrian crisis, where they used their veto right three times in one year. Furthermore, all four 
cases discerned what could be described as a ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia, as they 
displayed similar voting behavior and challenged the general balance of power. Consequently, 
the last period from 2007 - 2013 has seen China issuing their veto right in three cases, 
warranting the question of whether they have become less flexible in recent times?   
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4. Conclusion 
Following our analysis we can identify a general pattern that China has crafted for itself, in 
order to balance its traditional stance on humanitarian intervention and their great power 
responsibilities. This pattern was ascertained in the form of at least four principles, guiding 
their behavior as a great power in relations to humanitarian intervention. These principles 
carefully fit within the laws of the UN Charter governing the international society and the 
UNSC, allowing China to accept Chapter VII resolutions without eroding their historical 
adherence to state sovereignty. These principles were identified as follows: 
 
 The element of consent in order to accept any Chapter VII intervention   
 UNSC authorization of all Chapter VII military intervention   
 Limiting war by peaceful measures over coercion 
 A principle of uniqueness, that no one case should set precedence for future UNSC 
action   
 
Answering the Research Question 1:  
China has since its UN membership in 1971, and its reforms in the late 1970's, become more 
and more embedded in the international society. This embedment has culminated in the po st-
Cold War era, where China as a part of the UNSC have been 'forced' to deal with the issue of 
humanitarian intervention. From the first part of our analysis we can conclude that the 
traditional principles adhered to by China were identified as being: state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, non-aggression, and non-interference. These principles serve as an 
assurance so as to not risk experiencing the same subjugation as in the Century of Humiliation. 
This concern is evident in the ongoing criticism that China has voiced each time it has let a 
Chapter VII resolution pass, of non-intervention, non-interference and non-aggression. 
 
Answering Research Question 2: 
Based on his three criteria, Bull identified China as a great power in 1977. Through the same 
procedure we reached the same conclusion, in a contemporary context. China is therefore 
defined as a great power because it has a strong military capacity, is a permanent member of 
the UNSC, is a donor of foreign aid and a participant in UN peacekeeping operations, and have 
a political willingness to improve its relationship with all nations, including the US.   
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The greatest responsibility of a great power is the responsibility to preserve the international 
order. This is achieved by maintaining the balance of power between states, avoiding and 
controlling crises, limiting wars, and establishing spheres of influence.  Our analysis has 
shown how China has been willing to claim its great power responsibility to determine issues 
important to the international order. This is evident in the heavy criticism China has voiced, in 
cases such as Kosovo and Libya, where China's right and duty to have a say in the execution of 
the mandates they have sponsored, have been undermined. They have also been willing to 
exercise their veto right in order to maintain this claim. 
 
Towards the Problem formulation from 1990-2013:  
While some scholars argue that China has hardened their stance on humanitarian 
intervention, or has always had a rigid and inflexible stance on humanitar ian intervention, our 
analysis concludes otherwise. Throughout the 1990's and early 2000's China displayed a 
flexible and responsible handling of humanitarian crisis, acquiescing to resolutions that 
clearly violated their traditional principles. While we must acknowledge that the vetoes in the 
cases of Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Syria do imply a more assertive management of their great 
power role. We do not believe these cases constitute a permanent shift in China’s behavior.  
 
We concluded that Myanmar and Zimbabwe were vetoed because they were part of China's 
sphere of influence, which they sought to protect from UNSC interference. While this might 
seem ambiguous and irresponsible behavior for a great power, it nonetheless illustrates 
exceptions from the norm. Furthermore, the case of Syria can be traced directly to the 
aftermath of the intervention in Libya, and China's concern of NATO exceeding the UNSC 
mandate. The fact that a majority of the UNSC members are part of NATO was a threat to the 
general balance of power, and rendered Russia and China without a stake in determining the 
execution of the mandate, which can be translated into being a great power right and duty. 
Therefore it is not surprising that China reacted with concern when the US showed signs of 
planning unilateral action in Syria.  
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The Chinese vetoes in Syria should be regarded in remembrance of the history of China, 
especially the Century of Humiliation. With the historical perspective along with the aftermath 
of Libya in mind, the vetoes in Syria did in great power management terms assure that the 
general balance of power did not get tilted towards the western powers again. In this light the 
partnership that we identified between China and Russia from the Myanmar case and 
onwards is understandable, and serves to isolate neither states in their skepticism towards 
humanitarian intervention. 
 
Therefore we can conclude that China's decisions to veto UNSC action in Myanmar, Zimbabwe 
and Syria, does not constitute a reason to believe that China will not continue to utilize the 
four principles we identified, to allow Chapter VII interventions to pass in other cases. 
However we can conclude that there is a tendency for China to assert themselves when what 
they regard as their sphere of influence is the subject of resolutions. In addition to this the 
Syrian case so far has not included the elements leading China to accept a Chapter VII 
resolution in previous cases, such as host state consent or the exhaustion of diplomatic 
measures. Therefore it should not come as a surprise that China has opposed a resolution on 
the Syrian crisis so far.  
 
Rather than seeing their great power responsibilities conflicting with their traditional stance 
on humanitarian intervention, our analysis concludes that the two are mor e complementary 
than conflictual. In what can be referred to as a 'case by case' basis, China guided by the four 
principles we identified has sought to balance their duties and rights as a great power, with 
their historic principles. Sometimes it has proven valuable for China to veto a resolution in 
order to gain a diplomatic victory, as the Myanmar case showed, at other times it has resorted 
only to criticism and acquiesce to resolutions for the preservation of the international order.  
 
From this we can conclude that the responsibility that China bears as a great power only 
creates tension with its traditional principles on a theoretical level. This project shows that in 
practice, China has found a way of being able to voice criticism towards, abstain from, and 
veto resolutions violating their preferred stance on non-intervention, while still managing 
their relations with other great powers in a responsible way. While there might be more, the 
four principles we have managed to identify provides legitimate reasons, to at all times be 
against humanitarian intervention, while also providing a possibility to accept Chapter VII 
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resolutions in cases where China might deem it necessary. The fear of precedence and 
subsequent risk of foreign intervention in Chinese domestic affairs is understandable in the 
early 1990's, in the light of Tiananmen Square and the US, UK and France dominance on UNSC 
issues. However, in current times China has no real reason to fear intervention, and with what 
can be described as a strategic partnership with Russia, China stands with the opportunity of 
having a real impact on the international society's position towards intervention.  
 
Answering the Problem Formulation 
Our research shows that China's position on humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War 
era reflects not a tension, but a modification or merging of its traditional principles of 
sovereignty with the responsibilities of a great power in the modern day international society. 
This is of course an ongoing and difficult process, but as far as this project can illustrate, there 
has been more instances of China putting the international order first, instead of its traditions. 
However, always adhering to the pattern that they have so shrewdly, concocted for them to 
navigate in contemporary international society.   
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